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I. INTRODUCTION

How to enable entrepreneurs to appropriate the fruits of
their investments in cumulative and sequential innovation' without
impeding follow-on innovation and without creating barriers to entry2 has become one of the great unsolved puzzles that the law and
1. See generally, e.g., JAMES E. BESSEN & ERIC S. MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION,
PATENTS, AND IMITATION (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-01, Jan. 2000), availableat
http:lpapers.ssrn.comlsol3/delivery.taf?28464&_UserReference=4EBC6F1F9361AC2139EC82E;
Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2674, 2676 (1994) (distinguishing "traditional, discrete invention moder' from
"cumulative systems model"); Suzanne Scotchmer, ProtectingEarly Innovators: Should SecondGenerationProducts Be Patentable?,27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1996); Margaret Sharp, Technological Trajectoriesand CorporateStrategies in the Diffusion of Biotechnology, in TECHNOLOGY AND
INVESTMENT: CRUCIAL ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, at 93, 94-97 (1990) ("Technological trajectories...
describe the pathway by which the technology, given the thought-set, develops over time ...
[and] reflect, not the radical shifts in technology, but the incremental innovation which results
from the continuous, marginal improvements in product and process technology.").
For the development of the importance of technological trajectories, i.e., cumulative and sequential innovation, see Richard R. Nelson, Preface to Part IV.Innovation and the Evolution of
Firms, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 219-20 (Giovanni Dosi et al. eds., 1988);
Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation, 6 RES. POL'Y
37, 37-76 (1977); see also Giovanni Dosi, The Nature of the Innovation Process, in TECHNICAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 221-35, supra; Giovanni Dosi, Technological Paradigmsand
Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretationof the Determinants and Directions of
Technical Change, 11 RES. POL'Y 147, 147-62 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw,
75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1041-42, 1065-67 (1997); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991; see also Wendy J.
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economics of intellectual property rights needs to address as the
new millennium gets underway.3 This Article draws briefly from my
earlier works4 to identify some of the key historical difficulties encountered in protecting small grain-sized innovations5 that do not
rise to the level of "novel and nonobvious inventions" or "original
and creative works of authorship." 6 It then re-examines these difficulties through the lens of a hypothetical "green tulip" problem,
which encapsulates certain recurring investment dilemmas that
afflict entrepreneurs operating under the hybrid intellectual property regimes available from both the domestic and international
intellectual property systems. 7 Without focusing on the technical
operations of any of these hybrid regimes in detail, the green tulip
exercises set out below will demonstrate why, from a structural
perspective, they tend systematically to thwart the most socially
desirable outcomes, especially with regard to follow-on innovations.
The Article goes on to show how innovators and second comers
working on common technical trajectories could better resolve these
same problems by a more rational allocation of their collective costs
of research and development ("R&D"). 8

Gordon, On Owning Informationw IntellectualPropertyand the RestitutionaryImpulse, 78 VA. L.
REV. 149, 222-24, 230-38 (1992); Ejan Mackaay, An Economic View of Information Law, in
INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 43, 56 (Willem F. Korthals et al. eds., 1992).
3.
See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INL L. & POL. 897, 908 (1988); William Kingston, The 'Thesis" Chapters, in DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-124 (William Kingston ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Kingston, Thesis Chapters]; Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H.
Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2308, 2332-65 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson, et al., Manifesto]; William Kingston, Unlocking the Potential of Intellectual Property 3-4 (June 2000) (paper presented to the Swedish
International Symposium on Economics, Law and Intellectual Property, Gotheberg, June 26-30,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kingston, Unlocking].
4. See infra note 40.
5.
I am indebted to Mitchell D. Kapor for directing my attention to the behavioral aspects
of small grain-sized innovation in the software industries.
6.
See J.H. Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy: Premises
for a Restructured InternationalIntellectualPropertySystem, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475,
485-96 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse] (stressing foundational role of patent and copyright systems in protecting relatively large grain-sized intellectual productions, viz,
"novel and nonobvious inventions" and "original and creative works of authorship," and identifying negative economic premises thought to underlie these systems). For universal minimum
standards harmonizing the protection of both inventions and literary and artistic productions,
see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197, arts. 2(1), 9-14, 27-34
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
7.
See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2448-53 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids].
8.
See supranote 1.
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More broadly, I seek to refocus the attention of legal and
economic analysis on the potential benefits of liability rules over
property rules in the subpatentable environment 9 and to emphasize
the role of the public domain in a technological universe in which
the funding of small-scale applications of know-how to industry is
increasingly critical to entrepreneurial success. 10 I will suggest that
a crucial test of any socially desirable regulatory model for smallscale innovation is the extent to which measures that deter freeriding appropriation also retain a capacity to enrich-rather than
diminish-the public domain." Besides demonstrating the high but
often hidden opportunity costs that inherently result when a proliferation of hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights govern smallscale innovation, this Article concretely illustrates the ways in
which an alternative regime built on compensatory liability principles could stimulate investment without chilling follow-on innovation and without creating legal barriers to entry. 12 It ends by noting

9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). For recent debate, see
generally, for example, Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-39 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules FacilitateBargaining?A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J.
221, 222-31 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). For the view that property rules are always
socially more desirable for large grain-sized intellectual creations, see Robert P. Merges, Of
PropertyRules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664-67 (1994). This
Article takes the opposite view with respect to small grain-sized innovation.
10. For new thinking about the problems of funding innovation, see, for example, Brett
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 349-53 (2000); Carole Ganz-Brown, Patent Policies to Fine Tune
Commercializationof Government-SponsoredResearch, 26 Sci. & PUB. POL. 403 (1999).
11. See, e.g., David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1981, at 147. For renewed attention to the role of the public domain in intellectual
property law, see generally, for example, JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 155-

57 (1996) (stressing undervaluation of public domain in copyright law premised on expanded
notion of originality); Yochai Benider, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Julie Cohen, Lochner
in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 'Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462,
468-80 (1998); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
12. This Article thus builds on my previous efforts to clarify the pro-competitive role of the
liability rules used to stimulate investment in subpatentable innovation during the Industrial
Revolution. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2520-29 ('Nature and Limits of Classical Trade Secret Law"); see also Steven N.S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20
ECON. INQUIRY 40, 44 (1982); David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner,
Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 61, 64. It benefits from
other recent work that underscores the risk of balkanizing the public domain through inappropriate legal responses to the risk of market failure. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining
Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE

SOCIETY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al., eds., forthcoming 2000); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
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ways in which the compensatory liability rules proposed to address
the puzzle of small grain-sized innovation would also go a long way
toward answering hard questions about how to protect applications
of traditional. biological and cultural knowledge to industry, questions that are of increasing importance to developing and leastdeveloped countries. 13
II. RETHINKING THE PUZZLE OF SMALL GRAIN-SIZED
INNOVATION

So long as innovators can keep their know-how under actual
or legal secrecy, and the resulting innovations are relatively difficult to copy, they expect a period of natural lead time during which
they may try to recoup their investments and turn a profit. Even in
the earliest days of the Industrial Revolution, however, it was clear
that investors in some small-scale applications of intangible knowhow to products sold in the open market would suffer from a chronic
shortage of natural lead time in the brave new world of free competition. 14 As far back as the seventeenth century, for example, producers of textile and fabric designs had voiced complaints about a

Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698, 698-701 (1998); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INTL L.J.
151, 215-18 (1999). See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163 (1999) [hereinafter Heller, Boundaries];Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
13. See generally ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the
Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998); Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic Resources and Traditional
Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and Obligations in World Trade Law, 1 J. INTL ECON.
L. 555 (1998); Kamal Puri, Preservationand Conservationof Expressions of Folklore, COPYRIGHT
BULL. (UNESCO), Oct.-Dec. 1998, at 5.
14. Although the worldwide intellectual property system has always experienced difficulties
in stimulating investment in some types of small-scale innovation, traditional legal scholarship
perceived these shortcomings as a pesky but relatively minor problem that exerted little adverse
influence on its core operations. See, e.g., 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 828-31 (1975) (discussing evolution of early design protection laws and noting perception of industrial designs as the "poor relation" or stepchild of industrial property law). At the core were the fledgling patent and copyright
paradigms, which had still to be worked out in ways that enabled inventors and creators to capture the value of their intangible productions within and across territorial boundaries, but without subverting the public interest in free competition. See, e.g., BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE,
1760-1911, at 2-4, 61-100 (1999) (describing the fluid nature of intellectual property categories
prior to 1850, when the patent and copyright systems crystallized); see also id. at 101-28 (discussing the "crystalli[z]ation of the categories"); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950).
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lack of legal protection against unauthorized imitations. 15 During
the nineteenth century, when the dominant patent and copyright
paradigms crystallized, these complaints gave way to more robust
demands by manufacturers of goods produced in series for special
design laws to protect the ornamental features of useful articles
(including nonfunctional, three-dimensional product configurations)
and for utility model laws to protect novel functional shapes that
improved the usefulness of handtools and everyday household articles. 16 Because entrepreneurs who developed innovative industrial
designs falling within either category could not keep their noncopyrightable and subpatentable know-how secret once it had been embodied in products distributed in the open market, slavish imitators
could reduce their natural lead time to zero without incurring any
7
significant R&D costs of their own.'

15. The first statute to deal explicitly with the legal protection of designs was the Calico
Printers' Act of 1787, which conferred two months protection on new and original patterns "for
printing linens, cottons, calicos or muslins." SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 14, at 63-64 (citing
An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing and Printing Linens, Cottons, Calicos and
Muslins by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers and Proprietors for a Limited Time, 1787, 27 Geo. III ch. 38 (Eng.) (1787 Calico Printers' Act)).
16. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 14, at 828-30, 837-40 (discussing industrial designs); id. at
949-51 (discussing utility models); SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 14, at 64-67, 77-94 (discussing Great Britain's 1842 Ornamental Designs Act and 1843 Utility Designs Act); UMA
SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE 383-93 (2000) (discussing various European utility model
laws). See generally Janis, supra note 12, at 155-59 (classifying and discussing classical utility
model regimes).
17. In principle, the classical intellectual property system underlying the later Industrial
Revolution relegated the bulk of all subpatentable innovation to a loose set of liability rules
sounding in unfair competition law that gave investors only a period of natural lead time in
which to recoup their investments and establish their marks. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) ('The freedom to compete"); id. § 38 introductory note,
cmt. a C'rejecting the recognition of exclusive rights in intangible trade values"); JEROME PASSA,
CONTREFA9ON ET CONCURRENCE DtLOYALE 241-310 (1997) (surveying tensions with respect to
servile imitation and parasitical copying); ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW: THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY 6-77, 121-54 (1997) (advocating "new action of malign competition"). See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7,
at 2436-42 ('Historical Dependence of Intellectual Property Systems on a Substratum of Liability
Rules"). Within this laissez-faire regulatory environment, the temporary monopolies of the domestic patent laws, whose social costs arguably served to elevate the industrial techniques of
competition to their next highest level, were viewed as islands of protection in a sea of competition. See, e.g., HECTOR L. MACQUEEN, COPYRIGHT, COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 19-20
(1989); Michael Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property: PropertyRights as Restrictions on
Competition in Furtheranceof Competition, 20 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 9-11
(1989) [hereinafter Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Rights]; Michael Lehmann, The Theory of
Property Rights and the Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 525, 540 (1985) [hereinafter Lehmann, The Theory of PropertyRights].
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A. Hybrid Intellectual PropertyRights as Anti-Competitive Kudzu8
By the late twentieth century, it was clear that the vulnerability of industrial designs to slavish imitation had merely foreshadowed a wave of small-scale technical innovations whose similar
predicament would destabilize the patent-copyright dichotomy on
which the worldwide intellectual property system was, by then,
firmly grounded. 19 Computer programs, 20 integrated circuit
designs, 2 1 biogenetically engineered organisms, 22 new plant varieties, 23 and, most recently, electronically generated databases, 2 4 all

18. Kudzu is a Japanese vine that was brought to the United States to prevent soil erosion
and that has spread uncontrollably over the southern states. See Kudzu, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE 383-84 (Charles R. Wilson & William Ferris eds., 1989).
19. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention];
TRIPS Agreement, supranote 6.
20. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2332-65.
21. See, e.g., Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994)); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 3538 (incorporating by reference selected provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1484, which never entered into force);
ANDREW CHRISTIE, INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND THEIR CONTENTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 38, 23-47 (1995).

22. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 698-701; Kingston, Unlocking, supra
note 3, at 17-19; Sharp, supra note 1, at 101 (characterizing pharmaceutical trajectory of new
biotechnology in terms of "one step leads logically to the next," i.e., based on internal logic of
science, with rapid routinization and few discontinuities); see also Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology
and Patent Law: FittingInnovation to the ProcrusteanBed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
1, 24-85 (1991); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 193 (1987) (stressing the ease with which a small sample of a
culture can supply competitor with quantities of commercially valuable organisms); Ganz-Brown,
supra note 10, at 406-09 (stressing the differences in patterns of technical advance). A cottage
industry of proposals to protect biotech products under copyright law has predictably surfaced.
See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2472 n.193 (citing several such proposals).
23. See, e.g., International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter UPOV I], as amended on March, 19, 1991,
reprinted at 3 EUR. PAT. HANDBOOK (MB) ch. 90, available at www.upov.intengconvntns/1991/content.htm [hereinafter UPOV II]; Joshua V. Funder, Rethinking Patents for Plant
Innovation, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 551 (1999); Margaret Llewelyn, Patentingor Plant Vari-

ety Protection?,in WORLD TRADE FORUM 1999 (T. Cottier ed., forthcoming 2001). See generally
Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants:A Need for InternationalRegulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129 (2000); David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The
InternationalLegal Regime for PlantResources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998).
24. See, e.g., Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter E.C. Directive on
Databases]; H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) C'Collections of Information Antipiracy Ace'); H.R.
1858, 106th Cong. (1999) ('Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999"). See
generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui generis Protectionof Databasesin
the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997); J.H. Reichman & Paul Uhlir, Data-
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repropose conditions favoring market failure like those that in an
earlier period afflicted investors in both ornamental and functional
25
designs.
In place of the breakthrough or "pioneer" inventions of the
past, which still dominate our thinking about patents (and about
related contractual rights as well), 26 it is the "routine" engineers'
cumulative and sequential working out of shared or common technical trajectories that increasingly drives the post-modern economy
in Silicon Valleys and their equivalents throughout the world. 27 As
in the past, what today's routine engineer produces is essentially
technical know-how: that is to say, a store of information about
methods or processes of production that confers some commercial
advantages on those who possess it.28 What primarily differentiates
the production of today's cutting-edge technical know-how from the
bulk of the technical information generated during the Industrial
Revolution, however, is the chronic inability of those who invest in
its commercial exploitation to keep their know-how secret from
would-be competitors who can rapidly reproduce any incremental
innovation borne on or near the face of a product distributed in the
29
open market.
The vulnerability of small grain-sized innovation to freeriding duplicators who incur no appreciable costs of reverse engineering and who confer no appreciable lead time advantages on

base Protectionat the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
PropertyRights in Data?,50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997).
25. On the problem of market failure, see Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure
and Prisoner'sDilemma in Intellectual Property,17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854-59 (1992).
26. See generally Merges, supra note 9; Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of PatentScope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990).
27. See, e.g., BESSEN & MASKIN, supranote 1 (stressing high rate of innovation in software,
semiconductors, and computer industries despite historically weak patent protection); Sharp,
supranote 1, at 109-12 (discussing "[t]echnological trajectories, corporate strategies and biotechnology").
28. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supranote 14, at 1617; Kingston, Thesis Chapters,supra note 3, at 23. See generally FRAN9OIS DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW IN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 11 (2d rev. ed. 1976); FRANCOIS MAGNIN, KNOW-HOW ET PROPRIETE
INDUSTRIELLE 14-22, 93-94, 381-88 (1974).
29. Like appearance designs or the novel shapes of everyday useful articles, today's most
commercially valuable sets of subpatentable technical information are often literally "applied to
industry," in the sense that they are bundled into products that circulate in the open market.
See generally J.H. Reichman, Computer Programsas Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications
of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 656-69
(1989) [hereinafter Reichman, Computer Programs].
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those who first performed the underlying R&D under these conditions breeds fears of market failure that border on panic.3 0 The resulting dilemma is that, if unbridled competition appears likely to
induce suboptimal investment in the absence of natural lead time,
lessening competition under the patent and copyright paradigms
in order to actends to stretch these regimes to the breaking point
31
innovations.
grain-sized
smaller
commodate ever
The typical legislative response to this threat of market failure is to enact sui generis regimes of exclusive property rights, built
on modified patent and copyright principles, which afford target
classes of investors fixed periods of artificial lead time.3 2 In other
words, when faced with the risk of suboptimal investment in smallscale applications of know-how to industry, legislators and administrators turn instinctively to a property rule, and they assume that
patent and copyright princisome efficient admixture of modified
33
problem.
every
ples will resolve

30. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2511-20; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2332-65. This chronic shortage of natural lead time under present-day
conditions distorts foundational premises of a competitive economy that are still taken for
granted in traditional legal and economic thinking. Its inherent capacity to deter investment is
aggravated by the soaring costs of even routine innovation in some cutting edge disciplines and
by the shortened product cycles under which most manufacturers of consumer goods labor to
recoup those costs. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 1, at 97-109 (discussing developments in the
biotech market); Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2371-78 (discussing nature of
software market and its consequences).
31. Typical signs of this malaise include the stuffing of software into copyright law, the
spread of software patents, a general lowering of the nonobviousness criterion, and the extension
of patent protection to business methods. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Intellectual PropertyRights:
Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCIENCE 1933, 1933-34 (2000) (stressing need for stricter
standards of "nonobviousness" and measures favoring follow-on innovation); Julie E. Cohen &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (stressing need to allow reverse-engineering of software patents and need for narrow range of equivalents); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method PatentsBad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263, 267-77 (2000); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 584-606 (1999). See generally Samuelson et
al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2332-65 (demonstrating inability of existing regimes adequately
to protect computer software).
32. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2453-2500.
33. For the record, let me confess that, as late as 1989, I, too, remained hopeful of finding
the right "admixture" of modified copyright principles to solve the problem. See, e.g., J.H.
Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a
TransnationalPerspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 5, 141-53 (1989/1990) [hereinafter Reichman,
Design Protection] ('Logic of a Modified Copyright Approach"). The blinders were lifted during
the three-year investigation of computer programs with Samuelson, Davis, and Kapor, which led
to the insights, published, respectively, in Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, and Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7. By the same token, these same "blinders" led me to too
harshly criticize the United Kingdom's Unregistered Designs Act of 1988, Reichman, supra, at
148-50; see also SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 303-17 (summarizing this law), which, in retro-
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In this climate, the European Community has recently taken
steps to strengthen and harmonize the design protection laws of its
member countries, 3 4 and to mandate utility model laws that will
confer patent-like protection on small-scale (i.e. less than nonobvious) innovation generally. 35 Other miniature legal monopolies, derived from the same historical matrix that the early design and
utility model laws first established, are routinely enacted in Europe
and elsewhere to protect ever smaller fragments of innovative contributions. Recent examples include sui generis laws protecting integrated circuit designs, plant breeders' varieties, boat hull designs,
and most egregiously computer-generated databases, 3 6 whose proprietors obtain a strong perpetual monopoly in return for mere in37
vestment in non-original collections of data.
This proliferation of technology-specific mini-monopolies has
proceeded with no assessment of the aggregate social costs resulting from diminished opportunities to compete and with little regard
to the historical role of the public domain as the source of inputs for
cumulative and sequential innovation in dynamic free-market

spect, possessed some features of a nascent liability regime to which I was insufficiently attentive.
34. See Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October,
1998 on the Legal Protection of Designs, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28 [hereinafter E.C. Directive on
Designs]; SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 28-54. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protection in the European Union, 24 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. ASS'N Q. J. 611 (1996). Whether a proposed E.C. Design Regulation, which would further strengthen registered design protection throughout the European Union and possibly introduce a second tier of unregistered, more copyright-like scheme of design protection will also be
enacted remains to be seen. See SUTHERSANEN, supranote 16, at 55-80; Annette Kur, The Green
Paper'sDesign Approach: What's Wrong with It? 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374 (1993).
35. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 12, at 155-77; Jerome H. Reichman, Electronic Information
Tools: The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 446, 451-55 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, Electronic Information Tools]. The
European Commission proposes to extend utility model protection to all European Union countries and their affiliates. See SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 494-502 (reprinting the Amended
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model (Draft E.C. Directive on Utility Models));
Janis, supra note 12, at 153-55.
36. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at
2453-500; supranotes 20-24 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 24; see also KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 31 (discussing a
1992 French proposal for a miniature exclusive right in "any creation that is capable of being
exploited for profit resulting from intellectual work'); Christian Le Stanc, Intellectual Property
on Procrustes'Bed: Observationson a FrenchDraft Bill for the Protectionof Reserved Creations,'
14 EUR. INTELL. PROR. REV. 438, 438-44 (1992).
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economies. 3 8 If legislatures in developed countries keep adding
these epicycles to the classical intellectual property system while
ignoring the real, rather than the apparent, causes of its breakdown
in the post-industrial age, I predict that a spreading thicket of
poorly conceived and overly protective intellectual property rights
may progressively discourage, rather than encourage, investment in
subpatentable innovation across large segments of the global marketplace.39
B. The Flawed HistoricalModels: Design and Utility Model Laws
My first articles examined the historical models-design and
utility model laws-that were used to address the puzzle of smallscale innovation in the nineteenth century. 40 I tried to understand
why the design laws had uniformly failed to live up to the expectations placed in them, why no consensus solution to the quest for a
model design protection law had come to light after so much time
and effort, 41 and why local design industries in some countries with
relatively weak protection (notably, Italy) had prospered and even
outperformed similar industries in countries with relatively strong
protection (notably, France). 42 These articles revealed an inherent
tension between relatively weak and relatively strong forms of design protection that triggered a recurring cyclical movement be-

38. See supra note 11; cf. James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
Discriminationand Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000) (stressing benefits of competition and need for public domain inputs into the information economy).
39. Accord Janis, supra note 12, at 200-19; Kingston, Unlocking, supra note 3. This kudzulike thicket could eventually weaken the comparative advantages that developed countries currently enjoy in the market for knowledge goods and make them increasingly vulnerable to products from those developing countries that took pains to gear their catch-up efforts to more competitively organized systems of local innovation. Cf. Michael North, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creatinga Competitive Advantage for ForeignMultinationalCompanies?,
18 B.U. IVL L.J. 111 (2000).
40. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143 [hereinafter
Reichman, Designs Before 1976]; J.H. Reichman, Design ProtectionAfter the Copyright Act of
1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 267 (1984)
[hereinafter Reichman, Designs After 1976]; Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools, supranote
35, at 451-55; Reichman, Design Protection,supra note 33.
41. See Reichman, Design Protection,supra note 33, at 133-35 CFailings of the Modified
Patent Approach").
42. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 40, at 1153-58 ('The Unity of Art
Thesis in France"); id. at 1182-86 (noting that Italian law rejects copyright protection of industrial designs); id. at 1213-23 (discussing the relatively weak protection of Italian designs under
sui generis regime). French law still cumulatively applies both copyright and sui generis design
laws. See, e.g., SILVIA MAGELLI, L'ESTETICA NEL DiRiTTo DELLA PROPRIETA INTELLETTUALE 5787 (1998); SUTHERSANEN, supranote 16, at 137-71.
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tween states of perceived underprotection and states of perceived
43
overprotection.
In more recent articles, I have tried to explore the root
causes of this cyclical pattern and of the other infirmities that my
study of hybrid regimes brought to light, particularly the economic
and doctrinal contradictions associated with the ever-growing practice of rewarding less than nonobvious innovation with powerful
exclusive property rights.44 I concluded that what undermined the
hybrid intellectual property regimes was not just their ad hoc,
technology-specific birthmarks or the inability of legislatures to
craft appropriate admixtures of modified patent and copyright principles. It was, rather, that from the oldest to the newest, most of
these regimes suffered from a common structural defect: namely,
that legal theory had blindly, and by a series of historical accidents,
committed itself to solving the puzzle of small-scale innovation by
means of a property rule, whereas the problems entrepreneurs actually faced resulted from the failure of a liability rule for which
45
some functional equivalent was badly needed and long overdue.
Since publishing those articles, I have gained new insights
into the puzzle of small-scale innovation from the critical attention

43. For a discussion of the "cyclical nature of the design phenomenon in all legal environments," see Reichman, Design Protection, supra note 33, at 123-35. For an economists difficulties with conceptualizing states of "under" and "over" protection, see Ejan Mackaay, Legal Hy-

brids: Beyond Propertyand Monopoly?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2630, 2634-39 (1994). Some countries
that experimented with a relatively weak form of protection against slavish imitation (which I
choose to call a "copyright-like" approach) were likely to shift to relatively stronger forms of protection that covered imitations and follow-on products (usually at the cost of imposing higher
standards of eligibility); while other countries (and sometimes the very same countries that had
at one time embraced that more "patent-like" approach) might shift away from stronger forms of
protection back to softer, more copyright-like forms of protection (a move logically accompanied
by lower, more accessible standards of eligibility). For details, see Reichman, Design Protection,
supra note 33, at 123-35. Viewed over a two-hundred year period, indeed, design protection law
seemed like a legal merry-go-round on which legislatures, courts, and commentators in different
countries kept changing seats, often without perceiving the recurring pendular movement of
which they were a part.
44. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2504-29; Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse, supra note 6, at 504-20; see also Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools, supra note 35, at
472-75; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2330-69.
45. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2519-57. I argued, in short, that it was
not the mature patent and copyright paradigms operating within their historical spheres of influence that had broken down, but classical trade secret law that had broken down under present
day conditions, leaving small-scale innovators to cope with a chronic shortage of natural lead
time. To properly resolve the puzzle of small-scale innovation, therefore, a new kind of regime
was needed, which I called "a general purpose innovation law on modified liability principles,"
and which might appropriately be thought of as a "portable trade secret' law. See id.; see also
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24, at 145-51; Samuelson et aL, Manifesto, supra note 3, at
2368-2426.
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given to my previous work;4 from ongoing efforts to adapt my proposed regime to the needs of developing countries in order to
stimulate local innovation;4 7 and, above all, from practical experience in seeking to defend the interests of science and education
against overly broad legislative proposals to protect databases. 8
The single most important insight gleaned from all these sourcesand the one that most compels me to write the present Article-is
that the hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights uniformly saddle the process of follow-on innovation with unacceptably high social costs.

49

To be sure, there is continuing debate about the ability of
even the mature patent and copyright paradigms to satisfactorily
balance public and private interests in promoting follow-on innovation.50 While this is not the place to discuss that topic, 5 1 I stress at

46. See, e.g., Symposium: Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2307, 2559-2677 (1994).
47. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From FreeRiders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INVL L. & POL. 11, 67-74 (1996/1997) [hereinafter Reichman,
Free Riders]; see also KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL

ECONOMY 178-81 (2000).
48. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 24, at 832-38. See also Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection The Role of JudicialReview in the Creationand Definition
of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, A
Response to ProfessorBenkler, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 605 (2000); see generally Symposium, The
Impact of Technological-Changeon the Creation,Dissemination, and Protection of Intellectual
Property,62 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2001).
49. See Janis, supra note 12, at 200-07 (predicting anticommons effects for follow-on improvers under expanded utility model laws). Some fine work concerning the economics of followon improvers in patents and copyrights applies with even greater force, in my view, to the puzzle
of subpatentable innovation. See generally Lemley, supra note 2; Scotchmer, supra note 1;
Scotchmer, supra note 2; see also MARK SCHANKERMAN & SUZANNE SCHOTCHMER, DAMAGES AND
INJUNCTIONS IN PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RESEARCH TOOLS (Univ. of Cal. Inst. of Bus. & Econs.

Research Working Paper No. E-00-288, 2000), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/-scotchltoosl1.PDF.
50. See generally, e.g., Cohen & Lemley, supra note 31; Scotchmer, supra note 1; Scotchmer,
supra note 2; Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh, Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright
Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 39, 51-56 (1998); Lemley, supranote 2;
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177
(2000).
51. A worldwide concern to stimulate risky investments in patentable inventions and original works of authorship has nonetheless elicited an internationally binding set of baseline entitlements that initially favor inventors and authors, while subjecting them to countervailing
ambiguities in doctrines controlling the scope of protections that are left to the domestic intellectual property laws. These offsetting doctrines vary in strength from one jurisdiction to another
and often within single jurisdictions at different times, and there is no consensus about how to
draw the lines in specific cases or with respect to certain subject matter categories of protection.
See, e.g., Reichman, Free Riders, supra note 47, at 29-42. Even so, the social costs of assigning
inventors and authors exclusive rights to "equivalent inventions" and "derivative works" are
attenuated in practice by thus judicially limiting the range of equivalents in crowded fields or
when competitors have added significant value of their own, and perhaps above all, by encour-
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the outset that a different calculus of social costs and benefits applies when small grain-sized innovation is at stake. Without the big
social pay-offs expected from major innovations-patentable inventions and copyrightable works of authorship-one may question a
priori the use of powerful exclusive rights to elicit technical contributions within the reach of routine engineers, which entrepreneurs
would usually need to make anyway simply to maintain a competitive advantage. 52 There is likewise a compelling need to seek alternative solutions to the problem of appropriability so as to encourage
investment without necessarily entitling the first- or the second
53
comer to all the returns from follow-on innovation.
In what follows, I will try to show why a liability rule correctly addresses this critical problem of follow-on innovation at the
subpatentable level. Using a single, hypothetical problem-the
"green tulip problem"-against which we can test the prototypical
models underlying all the sui generis regimes of intellectual property rights,5 4 I propose to demonstrate concretely why a property
rule fails to solve the problem of follow-on applications of subpatentable know-how to industry, and why a properly crafted liability
rule would solve that same problem with fewer social costs and
without impoverishing the public domain.
III. THE "GREEN TUIP" PROBLEM: UNPACKING RIGHTS IN
SUBPATENTABLE INNOVATION

In order to see how hybrid intellectual property regimes affect decisions to invest in small grain-sized innovation, we turn now
to the green tulip problem. Before proceeding further, however, I
need to clarify that the ensuing discussion about the investment
dilemmas that hypothetical plant breeders might face when evalu-

aging resort to private contractual agreements to overcome the ambiguities otherwise built into
legal rules governing the scope of protection. See also MASKUS, supranote 47, at 199-233.
52. See Matthew Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 79 (1967)
(making this point nicely in the context of a legal and economic analysis of design protection
laws). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents:The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail,71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996).
53. See generally Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, Accessing and Expanding the Science
and Technology Knowledge Base, 16 STI REV. 14 (1995); Lester Thurow, Needed: A New System
of Intellectual PropertyRights, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95. Indeed, it is precisely
their inability to solve the problem of follow-on innovation in the subpatentable environment
that largely accounts for the recurring cycles of perceived under- and overprotection that plague
the sui generis regimes in the first place.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 80-101.
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ating the uncertain market prospects for a new variety-the "green
tulip"-is not put forward with a view to illustrating the vagaries of
existing plant variety protection laws as such. 55 On the contrary, for
the purpose of this exercise, I have deliberately assimilated all the
hybrid regimes built around modified patent and copyright principles-both past and present-to two simple historical models or
prototypes, a strategy that ignores the many nuanced features that
actually distinguish such regimes in practice.
One basic model provides small grain-sized innovations with
relatively weak protection against copying under a low eligibility
requirement of "originality."56 Known historically as a "copyright
approach," I prefer to call this type of regime "a copyright-like approach" to distinguish it from full copyright protection (such as
France gives to industrial designs) 57 and to emphasize that it would
not typically protect against unauthorized follow-on creations in the
way that the mature copyright paradigm clearly prohibits unauthorized derivative works. 58 The other basic model, which I call the
"patent-like approach," 59 would typically condition eligibility on

55.

For these laws, see generally UPOV I, supra note 23; UPOV II, supra note 23; Funder,

supra note 23; Margaret Llewelyn, Patentingor Plant Variety Protection?, in WORLD TRADE
FORUM 1999, supra note 23.
56. Selected real-world examples might include the following- some early design protection
laws, such as the United Kingdom's 1842 Ornamental Designs Act, see SHERMAN & BENTLY,
supra note 14, at 64-67, the German Law Concerning Copyright in Designs and Models of January, 11, 1876, as originally enacted, see SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 173, the French 1806
Design Law, see id. at 135-36, the United Kingdom's 1843 Utility Designs Act (soon repealed), see
SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 14, at 64, 67, the first plant variety protection laws under
UPOV I, see supra note 23, the laws protecting integrated circuit designs (semiconductor chip
protection), see 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994), the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right,
Part III, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, §§ 213-263, see SUTHERSANEN, supra note
16, at 303-17 (summarizing this law); id. at 628-38 (providing extracts covering both functional
and nonfunctional designs), the United States' Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998 (which
covers one class of functional designs), see 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-32 (West 2000), the so-called
Nordic Catalogue Rule, i.e., the first sui generis laws to protect noncopyrightable collections of
facts or data, see, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2492-93. Many of these laws
would require more originality than mere independent creation alone.
57. See, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 136-38; supra note 42. The term "copyright
approach" often refers to the unsuccessful movement to incorporate industrial designs into the
Berne Convention, which was defeated in 1948, see Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note
40, at 1153-67, although it could also ambiguously indicate sui generis regimes that protect
against copying only. Hence, I shall use "copyright-like' to indicate the latter category only.
58. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West 2000); Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 12.
But see Geller, supranote 50, at 59-70 (arguing for a more nuanced use of remedies to encourage
follow-on creations under copyright law).
59. The term "patent-like approach" is used to distinguish it from laws applying full patent
protection C'patent approach") to industrial designs, such as still occurs only under United States
law. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-73 (West 2000). Most other countries have sui generis regimes
based on modified patent (and/or modified copyright) principles, and these are evoked by the
term "patent-like." See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supranote 14, at 837-40; SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at
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some form of novelty that was higher than an "originality" standard
though lower than the nonobviousness standard of the mature patent paradigm. It would confer a so-called absolute right that, at
least in principle, would prohibit the making of unauthorized, follow on innovations even in the absence of slavish imitation as
60
such.
In the real world of hybrid intellectual property rights, matters quickly become more complicated. For example, courts hostile
to specific legal monopolies or generally concerned about weakening
competition may, by interpretation, elevate any nominal threshold
of eligibility to functional equivalents of nonobviousness that only
legislatures can correct. 6 1 Courts may likewise narrow the scope of
protection by declining to see "equivalent" creations in practice, so
as to curb a regime that was nominally supposed to protect against
unauthorized follow-on creations. 62 Conversely, courts hostile to
free-riding or imbued with natural property right views may, by a
process of interpretation, lower a nominally stiff eligibility requirement or impede follow-on imitations in the name of "copying"

13-15. The United States now protects one category of designs (boat hull designs) under a sui
generis law. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 2000). In the literature, the term "patent approach"
can often signify what is unambiguously designated as the "patent-like approach" in this Article.
60. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 14, at 837-40. Selected examples might include: the
United Kingdom's Registered Designs Act of 1949, as last amended by the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988, see SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 276-303 (providing a summary); id. at
593-604 (providing extracts), Benelux and Nordic Design Laws, see SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16,
at 128-34 (providing a summary of Benelux design law); id. at 506-14 (providing extracts from
Uniform Benelux Designs Law); id. at 323-28 (providing a summary of Nordic design laws); see
also supra notes 14-16, 34-35, 40, the E.C. Directive on Designs, supra note 34, which should
oblige all European Union member countries to adopt a patent-like sui generis approach, all
existing utility model laws, see Janis, supranote 12, at 151-52 & n.5 (usefully subdividing these
into at least three subcategories), and the most recent round of plant variety protection laws
under UPOV If, see supranote 23.
61. German courts did this to the German design law, which started out as a copyright-like
model. See SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 556-57 (reproducing extracts of the Law Concerning
Copyright in Industrial Designs (Designs Law) of Jan. 11, 1876, as last amended by the Law of
Dec. 18, 1986, art. 1(2)); id. at 197 (noting that courts rejected softer "subjective novelty" standard that academics preferred in favor of "objective relative novelty"). The standard of "originality" under the United Kingdom's Registered Designs Act of 1949, see SUTHERSANEN, supra
note 16, at 276-303 (providing a summary); id. at 593-604 (providing extracts), was in fact tantamount to a nonobviousness standard until legislative adjustment in 1988. See, e.g., Reichman,
DesignProtection,supra note 33, at 148-49 n.948.
62. See, e.g., Reichman, Design Protection,supra note 33, at 133-134 & n.853. Even United
States courts applying design patent law are usually expected to see a zero range of equivalents,
despite nominal application of the full nonobviousness standard. See, e.g., id. at 53 (suggesting
that the range of equivalents may vary in practice with the functionality or decorativeness of the
design in question).
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even when the statute provides no formal basis for that result. 6
Moreover, in crafting any given hybrid exclusive right, legislatures
may deliberately blur the admixture of ingredients so that one cannot confidently classify it as either a "copyright-like" or a "patentlike" regime 64 (and it may empirically turn out to be more like one
65
or the other at different periods of time).
Nonetheless, for purposes of the "green tulip" exercise, we
shall keep matters simple by assuming perfect judicial compliance
with our perfectly crafted prototypical models. We shall also relax
the threshold of eligibility to the point where it usually ceases to
impinge on the analysis, that is, by assuming that all the smallscale innovations in question would normally meet any require66
ments of "originality or novelty" that might apply.
If either of these prototypes appeared likely to produce socially positive responses to our hypothetical investment dilemmas
in the abstract, we could profitably descend into an examination of
the more nuanced structural details that distinguish one hybrid

63. See, e.g., id. at 134 & nn.855-57 (noting bias toward protection of big firms in such
cases).
64. Recent examples might include: the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right, Part
III, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, see SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 303-17 (summarizing this law), which protects both functional and nonfunctional designs against copying,
and is subject to a user's compulsory license after five years, E.C. Directive on Databases, supra
note 24, which relaxes the eligibility requirements to mere "investment' and yet protects against
unauthorized follow-on databases in perpetuity, see, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24,
at 164 (deeming this a "monstrous caricature" of an intellectual property law). Efforts to attain
more patent-like protection for plant varieties led to the adoption of UPOV H, see supra note 23,

but the end result remains too weak for some and too strong for others. See, e.g., Reichman,
Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2469-72 (noting strengthened protection of derived varieties, but
also cumulative protection with plant patents and optional farmers' rights exception); Margaret
Llewelyn, The Relationship Between Plant Breeders Rights and Patents for Biotechnological
Inventions (1996) (on file with author).
65. The German Designs Law, see supra note 61, which is nominally a copyright-like model,
has a relatively high threshold of eligibility and will protect against unauthorized follow-on designs; however, independent creation remains a defense, see, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16,
at 193-201. The French Design Law of 1909 (as recodified in 1992) though nominally patent-like,
contains odd copyright-like features, and industrial designers may routinely fall back on French
copyright law. See, e.g., id. at 136-38. The Italian Legislative Provisions on Industrial Patents,
Royal Decree No. 1411 of August 25, 1940, arts. 1, 5-13, see id. at 575-77 (reproducing these
provisions), which adopts a patent-like model, gave only three years of protection (extended to
fifteen years in 1977) and has relatively soft standards of eligibility. See, e.g., id. at 219-23;
Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 40, at 1213-23.
66. In the real world, this assumption would skew the assessment of social costs because a
higher threshold of eligibility, by limiting the availability of a hybrid exclusive right, would to
some extent offset the costs accruing from a greater power to exclude. I ignore this factor here in
order to focus attention on the calculus of social costs as affected by a few constant variables
pertaining to follow-on innovation and no others. For the same reason, I ignore variants of the
novelty standard or stiff examination requirements that may also reduce the social costs (and/or
impede the social value) of any given hybrid regime.

1760

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:6:1743

regime from another. In reality, because the exercises set out below
will show why neither of these historical prototypes yields socially
justifiable results in the abstract, we need not further encourage
the quest for some unattainably perfect admixture of patent and
copyright principles by closely scrutinizing specific hybrid regimes
in these pages.
The chief advantage of this method is that, by simplifying
the standard components from which the hybrid regimes are
crafted, we shall clarify the most important recurring problems
they collectively fail to solve. Three caveats, however, should be
kept in mind. First, because important structural nuances do actually differentiate one copyright-like regime or one patent-like regime from another, were we to inquire more deeply, we should find
that these nuances would significantly affect the calculus of social
costs and benefits in actual practice. Second, even if the only option
available to legislators were a choice between a bad copyright-like
regime and a bad patent-like regime, the calculus of social costs and
benefits would differ significantly in the two cases, and different
67
countries might logically exercise their limited options differently.
In the real world of sui generis plant variety protection laws, for
example, where a copyright-like and a patent-like model have coexisted since 1991, there are good reasons why developing countries
in general might prefer the former and developed countries the latter, even if both models produced undesirable results in the end and
either might backfire on single firms operating within either group
of countries under the right set of circumstances. 68 Third, we shall
also close our eyes to the ways in which the existence and character
of any given sui generis regime affects the willingness of courts and
legislatures to expand or contract the domestic patent and copyright laws in order to accommodate borderline subject matter that
may have nowhere else to go. Although this issue seriously affects
the overall calculus of social costs, 69 it would take us too far afield
here.1 0

67. See, e.g., supra note 33 (acknowledging my preference for a copyright-like approach to
design protection in 1989 over a patent-like approach)
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also MASKUS, supra note 47, at 224;
JAYASHAREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
WAY FoRwARD FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 3 (forthcoming 2000).
69. Cf. Reichman, Design Protection, supra note 33, at 123-26 C'Cyclical Nature of the Design Phenomenon in all Legal Environments").
70. If the green tulip exercises persuade us to seek a better model law or different operating
principles, we would expect it automatically to reduce the tensions with patent and copyright
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However important all these matters are in the real-world
operations of specific hybrid regimes, we ignore them here and concentrate instead only on the two prototypical approaches mentioned
above. By applying these abstract regulatory models drawn from all
the hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights to a hypothetical
but characteristic problem of follow-on innovation, we can obtain a
generic picture of the social costs and benefits more or less attributable to all the relevant approaches in this particular respect. By
thus isolating a common set of problems and solutions, and by identifying a common set of errors or flawed results as well, the "green
tulip" exercise reveals a common basis for reforms that might put
an end to the current tendency to multiply ad hoc, technologyspecific mixtures of modified patent and copyright principles.
A. Stating the Problem
The hypothetical problem concerns three firms of established
plant breeders who regularly grow and sell flowers and who, from
time to time, introduce novel varieties bred from their own stocks.
One of the firms, Breeder A, develops a green tulip for the first time
ever. However, this firm gains little commercigl success from its
innovative variety because the consuming public does not appreciate green tulips enough to buy them.
Shortly thereafter, Breeder B develops a red, white, and
green tulip by combining Breeder A's green tulip variety with
stocks of his own. This new variety of tulip scores a commercial success in the relevant market segment, largely because ItalianAmericans love it. Subsequently, other breeders (collectively designated "Breeders C") cash in on B's success by using A's and B's varieties to produce an array of tulips in new color combinations built
around a green foundation.
Tulip Breeder A
Breeds a green tulip for
the first time ever, but
there is no
consumer market

Tulip Breeder B
Breeds a green, white, &
red tulip, using A's technology; he gains
commercial success

Other Breeders (C)
Other breeders cash in on
this success and extend the
technology to new color
combinations

laws by providing a workable alternative at acceptable social costs. See infra text accompanying
notes 187-88.
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The purpose of this hypothetical "green tulip" problem is to
clarify the ways in which existing intellectual property regimes that
deal with small grain-sized innovation articulate the relations between innovators and second comers. The core questions bear on
the extent to which different regimes enable the first comer,
Breeder A, to appropriate more or less of the fruits of his or her initial investment by participating in the gains from other breeders'
follow-on applications of the technical know-how initially generated.
To address these question, I must rely on certain basic assumptions that underlie the rest of the exercise. First and foremost,
we assume that the green tulip variety represents a small grainsized innovation, based on cumulative and sequential know-how,
that falls below the prevalent standard of nonobviousness applicable under relevant domestic patent laws (i.e., it is subpatentable by
definition).7 1 On this assumption, no plant patent is available, even
if Breeder A operated in a country that recognized plant patents,
and even if a green tulip variety might otherwise constitute patentable subject matter in that country. 72 We also assume that trade
secret law will not affect the outcome because the technical knowhow, once embodied in the product, is available to the world.
Moreover, there is no actual secret, because any breeder examining
the tulip will understand how to produce it from available exem-

71. Cf. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2000); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27; HANNS
ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS: SHOULD AN INVENTIVE
STEP ADVANCE THE ART? (1977).
72. See, e.g., Funder, supranote 23, at 551-56 (distinguishing plant patents from plant variety rights; noting impact of biotech methods on manipulation of sub-cellular components, which

undermined "whole organism" approach of breeders' rights and gave rise to patents on "genes,
proteins, biological processes as well as whole organisms, including varieties;" and also noting
that extension of UPOV II to cover "essentially derived varieties" was maybe a move away from
the protection of innovation towards "a limited invention"). In reality, the standard of nonobviousness as applied to cutting-edge technologies that fit imperfectly into the patent and copyright
paradigms has tended to decline nearly everywhere, so that a plant patent might actually be
available for such a variety in any country that enacts a plant patent law. How to maintain a
line of demarcation between plant patents and plant breeders' rights is thus another problem
raised but not addressed by the analysis below. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc. v. J.E.M. AG
Supply, 200 F.3d 1374 (2000) (patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes seeds
and plants grown from seed notwithstanding availability of plant variety protection under 7
U.S.C. § 2321); see also Funder, supra note 23, at 558-66 (discussing the difficulties in distinguishing patentable and unpatentable elements under art. 53(b) of the European Patent Convention).
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plars, 73 and we will further assume that no copyright or unfair
74
competition laws impede other breeders from doing just that.
Still another simplifying assumption is that, even though the
valuable know-how embodied in the "look" or design of the green
tulip results from a relatively small variation on technical solutions
already known to most other plant breeders who compete in the
relevant markets, this small variation on the prior art nonetheless
meets the threshold eligibility requirements of either of our prototypical regimes. 75 Finally, we assume that all the firms appearing
in our exercises operate within a single territorial unit, and only
76
territorial law applies.
B. StandardLegal Solutions
If one reviews all the hybrid intellectual property regimes
that deviate from the mature patent and copyright paradigms for
likely solutions to the problem of Breeder A's vulnerability to other
breeders' appropriating the fruits of his or her investment, one can
identify three basic fact patterns that recur with sufficient regularity as to merit particular attention. Two of these patterns flow from
the basic regulatory models identified above, namely, a relatively
weak, copyright-like form of protection and a relatively strong, patent-like approach. A third fact pattern arises when no baseline entitlements govern a specific type of innovation, and the fate of relevant investments depends entirely on free-market conditions. This
last situation is the raw or primordial state of affairs that we shall
look at first.
1. The Raw State of Affairs
In the raw state of affairs, there is no exclusive property
right in subpatentable technical innovation of any kind, and free
73. See, e.g., Funder, supra note 23, at 555 (discussing the logic of plant variety rights
whereby "[g]iven that [a] plant can replicate itself, the means by which others can make industrial use of the plant is disclosed by the plant itself').
74. Cf, e.g., MACQUEEN, supra note 17, at 39-52 (criticizing extension of United Kingdom
copyright law to protect industrial designs prior to 1988). But see, e.g., KAMPERMAN SANDERS,
supra note 17, at 121-211 (advocating broad protection in unfair competition law).
75. See, e.g., Funder, supranote 23, at 554-55; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76. In reality, the TRIPS Agreement mandates some sui generis protection of plant varieties, without specifying that a UPOV regime must be adopted. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 6, art. 27(3)(b); Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin
America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation? 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 129-30
(1996/1997); Reichman, FreeRiders, supranote 47, at 36-39.
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competition prevails.7 7 Under these conditions, Breeder A has no
legal right to protect the fruits of his or her investment (the green
tulip being neither patentable nor copyrightable). Therefore, Breeders B and C may free-ride on the former's investment to their
heart's content, especially in view of our operating assumption that
78
Breeder A will benefit from virtually no actual or legal secrecy. In
the worst case scenario (which interests us here for purposes of
sharper comparisons), the free-riding second comers take the market altogether. Unless Breeder A's other commercial activities prove
more successful, he may go out of business or avoid further investment in risky R&D, despite the objective commercial success of a
follow-on innovation built around his own earlier innovation.
In such a case, both the relevant technical community and
the public at large will have lost Breeder A's potential for developing further innovative contributions. This negative result follows in
part because Breeder A failed to share in the fruits of at least one
major commercial success and also because he received no direct or
indirect contributions to his sunk costs of R&D from either Breed79
ers B or C.
2. Hybrid Copyright-Like Solutions Apply
If we assume that Breeder A's legislature had responded to
complaints about the raw state of affairs by enacting a sui generis
regime loosely derived from the copyright model, 80 then Breeder A
could presumably invoke a weak intellectual property right against
the "copying" of his innovative product. This model, however, typically denies protected innovators any claim to rights in follow-on
innovation, such as Breeder B's red, white, and green tulip, 8 1 espe-

77. Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (boat hull design
slavishly imitated); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (lamp designs slavishly imitated).
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. This is usually a safe assumption in most design-related activities. In the field of computer software, however, where it is also a prevailing
assumption, there has been more debate about the relative difficulties of reverse-engineering by
proper means. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2333-42.
79. Of course, the raw state of affairs actually prevailed before UPOV I, see supra note 23.
For an interesting example drawn from the software milieu, consider that the producers of the
VisiCalc spreadsheet, which was immensely improved by Lotus 1-2-3, benefitted from no intellectual property rights and eventually went out of business. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFrWARE 64 (1991).

80. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., UPOV I, supra note 23. Also relevant are the laws protecting integrated circuit designs, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994), and the Nordic Catalogue Rule, see Reichman,
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cially when the second comer has invested funds, time, and effort of
his own to obtain it (a result that is not inconsistent with principles
82
of unfair competition law that some countries apply).
From an economic perspective, the copyright-like approach
to small-scale innovation either removes some of the uncertainties
of invoking an unfair competition law (in those countries that allow
actions against servile imitation as such) or it allows a roughly
equivalent action to be maintained against "copying" in countries
that do not recognize misappropriation as a business tort without
dirty tricks.83 Because such a pure misappropriation action clashes
with the principle of free competition, copyright-like regimes tend
to attenuate or mask this conflict by prohibiting wholesale duplication without necessarily conferring any rights against value-adding
producers who invest considerable time, money, and skill of their
own.
In principle, courts operating under a copyright-like regime
remain free to hold in specific cases involving follow-on productions
that a second comer appropriated too much of the first comer's creative or technical contribution, and such decisions can help to establish a jurisprudence deterring market-destructive conduct over
time. In practice, however, no two judges see alike in these matters,
and courts may balk at engrafting a pseudo-derivative work right
onto a copyright-like regime that lacks this legislative specification
and that operates with a low threshold of eligibility. 84 Moreover,

Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2492-93. However, some copyright-like regimes will protect
follow-on creations, see, e.g., German Design Law of 1876, SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 55657, and each sui generis regime would have to be carefully evaluated in the light of case law
before pronouncing on this question in the real world. Conversely, even under copyright law,
some courts may coordinate the extent of follow-on creativity in derivative works with a nuanced
mix of remedies. See Geller, supra note 50, at 59-70.
82. See, e.g., KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 24-66 (discussing possible actions
sounding in slavish imitation or parasitical copying in France, Benelux, Germany, and-in principle-Switzerland, but noting general unavailability of similar actions in United Kingdom and
Italian unfair competition laws).
83. Compare,e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 17, §§ 1, 38
& cmt. b (no misappropriation of trade values, especially information or other intangible assets,
without dirty tricks, lest exclusivity "impede access to valuable information and restrain information"), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing copyright-like protection
against copied boat hull designs).
84. The stronger the protection given against follow-on creations under a copyright-like regime, the more blurred becomes the line of demarcation between that sui generis regime and full
copyright protection. Courts may decide that such distinctions are not worth making and open
up copyright law (or patent law, as the case may be) to borderline small-scale creations. See
SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 114-17 (discussing Screenoprints,Ltd. v. Citroen NederlandBV,
Benelux Court of Justice, May 22, 1987, which opened Benelux copyright laws to industrial designs and thereby undermined patent-like Benelux sul generis design laws).
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experience with industrial design laws demonstrates that if the
legislature does specify a derivative work right (even by inference),
courts may elevate the eligibility requirements by interpretation so
as to narrow the anticompetitive effects of such regulatory action
after the fact. 85
To the extent that our prototypical regime either removes or
glosses over uncertainties in the ways such laws have actually been
applied in the past, the creator of the green tulip in our hypothetical problem, Breeder A, would wind up with a very weak claim for
relief under a copyright-like regime. So long as neither Breeder B
nor Breeders C slavishly imitated Breeder A's variety, but acted
instead as value adding (or, in some dubious usage, "transformative") users, they would not likely infringe under this prototypical
regime, which does not protect against the making of derivative varieties as such.
In a worst case scenario, the absence of any right to control
follow-on innovation or value-adding uses of his technical contribution thus means that Breeder A's position in the end is not appreciably better than it was under the raw state of affairs. Nevertheless, Breeder B's (and C's) success comes with something of a free
ride on Breeder A's initial investment. Carrying forward our worstcase scenario, Breeder A may again be forced to exit from the market because he failed to share in the commercial success of posterior
applications of his green tulip technology, or he may lack sufficient
capital to invest in further risky ventures that depend on R&D.
3. Hybrid Patent-Like Solutions Apply
If we assume that Breeder A's legislature had instead responded to the vulnerability of small-scale innovators by adopting a
sui generis regime loosely identified with the patent model, then
that regime would, at least in theory, protect qualifying innovators
against value-adding users who appropriated all or a substantial
part of the first comer's technical know-how. Here, in other words,
Breeder A could invoke a stronger right that would allow him to
interdict the production of unauthorized follow-on (or "derivative")
varieties notwithstanding the small grain-size of his own initial innovation (which was assumed to be less than nonobvious by hypothesis).

85. See supra note 61 (discussing case of German design law).
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Real world examples of such a regime might include many
present-day design protection laws, all utility model laws that cover
small (i.e., less than nonobvious) inventions,8 6 and even the latest
model law of plant breeders' rights that was negotiated at the international level in 1991.87 In actual practice, however, courts applying either utility model laws or design protection laws at the infringement stage tend to narrow the range of protected equivalents
when the alleged infringer adds substantial value of his or her own
to the underlying innovation.8 8 Because utility models (and some
protected appearance designs) are not subject to any qualifying examination of the prior art, and because in that case even the eligibility requirements are tested retroactively at the infringement
stage,8 9 any serious judicial resistance to the recognition of an appreciable range of equivalents tends to reduce their impact to a
codified form of unfair competition. 90
For purposes of the green tulip problem, however, let us ignore these real-world infirmities of the patent-like model and suppose that our prototypical regime possesses the structural capacity
to overcome them. Breeder A will then find himself in a good position. He can interdict unauthorized follow-on varieties, such as the
red, white, and green tulip, so long as they are deemed impermissibly "derivative" of, or "equivalent" to, Breeder A's underlying technical contribution. In this situation, Breeders B and C will need a
license from Breeder A in order to develop follow-on products that
apply Breeder A's earlier technology.
Note, however, that this legal constraint also puts Breeders
B and C at the mercy of Breeder A's willingness to deal and pricing
strategy; and it requires them to negotiate with Breeder A about
86. See, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supranote 16, at 383-97 (stressing that most utility model laws
provide "a no examination registration system with protection . . . available quickly and
cheaply"); Janis, supra note 12, at 151-54 (describing present and proposed utility model laws);
supra note 60 (referring to design laws of Benelux and Nordic countries and the E.C. Directive on
Designs).
87. See, e.g., UPOV II, supra note 23, art. 14 (protecting "essentially derived varieties");
Funder, supra note 23, at 556 (noting uncertainties of scope, especially possible extension of
subject-matter protection "beyond the physical phenotype to include some of the genetic means
by which a variety was produced," and generally questioning extension of "patent claims to
plants as innovations").
88. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 14, at 955; Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools, supra
note 35, at 453-54.
89. See supra note 86.
90. Similar criticism is often leveled at nominally strong laws protecting ornamental (i.e.,
appearance) designs of useful articles, many of which still require an examination of the prior
art, only to provide protection against slavish imitation in the end owing to judicial hostility.
See, e.g., Reichman, Design Protection, supra note 33, at 133-36 (discussing the failings of the
modified patent approach).
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these matters at a time when Breeders B and C have the greatest
uncertainty about the risks they face in extending A's innovation to
untried commercial applications. 91 Neither Breeders B nor C may
yet know whether, and at what cost, they can successfully apply
Breeder A's technical know-how to follow-on products. Above all,
they may be unable to estimate the potential for commercial success
of the proposed follow-on product without either committing to the
license ex ante, and thereby disclosing their own market potential
an infringement
to A (who may then simply copy it),92 or risking 93
action ex post by proceeding without authorization.
In the real world of hybrid intellectual property rights, legislatures concerned about the costs of this approach may sometimes
decide to relax the first comer's grip on follow-on applications by
denying the innovator a right to prevent independent creation. 94 In
such a case, structural adjustments to the law may attempt to distinguish between unauthorized follow-on productions that result
from "copying" the protected innovation and those that result from
permissible forms of "independent creation." Because this requires
a clear winner and a clear loser in every case, courts may find any
such structural nuances hard to apply without leaving a trail of inconsistent decisions, and they represent a move toward a more
copyright-like approach. 95 For present purposes, however, let us

91. Cf. Ian Ayres & Paul Kemperer, Limiting Patentees'Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999).
92.

The problem of bargaining over secret information is often called Arrow's Disclosure

Paradox after Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACrTVITY 609, 615 (National Bureau of Econ. Re-

search ed., 1962), discussed in Merges, supra note 9, at 2657-58. One should note that it acquires different nuances in the subpatentable environment from that of large-scale innovation,
and it is only the former context that I address.
93. On the ex ante versus ex post bargaining over the right to follow-on products in the context of patentable inventions, see generally Scotchmer, supra note 2; Scotchmer, supra note 1. I
take no position in this Article on proposals to reform the patent law as such; however, Scotchmer's work has enhanced my understanding of the subpatentable environment.

94. An example is the German Design Law of 1876, see supra note 61, which denies an absolute right, despite a comparatively high threshold of eligibility, and allows independent creation as a defense. See, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supranote 16, at 201. Another example might be the
United Kingdom's short-lived utility model law of 1843. See SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 14,
at 123; supranote 56.

95. See, e.g., Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (protecting functional designs, using a
mix of copyright-like and patent-like components, and allowing independent creation as a defense); SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 303-17 (summarizing the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right of 1988, which also protects functional designs, using a mix of copyright-like
and patent-like components, and allows independent creation as a defense). However, the pre-
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make a clarifying best-case assumption to the effect that the relevant legislature had properly crafted some workable "independent
creation" exception onto its hybrid, patent-like regime.
Even if this softer, more pro-competitive variant of the patent-like model were applied to the green tulip problem, however, it
would not significantly improve the plight of Breeders B and C as
described above. They must either acquire Breeder A's permission
(which could be denied), or independently repeat the costs of critical
development efforts that Breeder A had already sustained, and
then proceed to incur the further investment costs associated with
applying that technology to follow-on products. But Breeder A's own
product-the green tulip-did not score a commercial success; and
Breeder B's costs and risks in developing the red, white, and green
tulip could seem disproportionately high absent some way to test
the market for that project. 96 Furthermore, Breeder A could launch
an harassing infringement action questioning Breeder B's good
faith, and the latter might find it difficult to prove independent
generation of the entire innovation. Under these circumstances,
Breeders B and C are unlikely to develop follow-on products absent
a license from Breeder A, in which case they face the same constraints on licensing that were set out above.
In the worst-case scenario, Breeders B and C may logically
decide to avoid using the green tulip technology altogether, rather
than run the risks of dealing with Breeder A up front. All that
Breeders B and C bring to the table is an untried business idea that
Breeder A might be perfectly capable of implementing without any
present or future technical inputs from them. Faced with the decision to risk dealing with Breeder A or investing their resources in
developing "novel" varieties of their own that would themselves
qualify for relatively strong protection under a patent-like regime,9 7
they will more logically incline to make the latter decision.
Here the small grain-size of the innovation makes spending
the time and money to negotiate a contractual transaction less attractive than would be the case with respect to a large grain-sized

cise scope of protection under the United Kingdom's unregistered design right awaits further
judicial clarification. See, e.g., CHRISTINE FELLNER, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN LAW 202-07 (1995).
96. The follow-on innovator's need to test the market may differ from the initial innovator's
need to test the market. When the latter's problem is solved by means of a novelty grace period,
see, e.g., E.C. Directive on Designs, supra note 34, art. 6 (2), that solution-as applied to smallscale innovation-may further deter the would-be follow-on innovator because it gives the first
comer more time to commit (while holding a potential club against follow-on innovators who
move too fast).
97. Cf. Funder, supra note 23, at 556-58 (noting apparently stricter standards of eligibility
under UPOV II).
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invention covered by the domestic patent laws. 98 In the latter case,
if applying Inventor A's result to B's business plan proved technically difficult, Inventor A might rather cross-license than invest in
efforts to solve the same problem and develop the follow-on product
without potential Inventor B. 99
With regard to subpatentable innovation, however, follow-on
applications usually lie within the reach of routine engineers, especially if there is a market opening and some basis (if only a hunch)
for predicting a chance of commercial success. Once a green tulip
exists that bears Breeder A's technical know-how literally on its
face, a red, white, and green tulip becomes feasible, and there is
mainly a first mover advantage to be obtained. Given that the market for routine innovation tends to be fast-moving and dynamic, in
other words, because it encounters fewer technical obstacles,
Breeders B's and C's ideas for follow-on applications are most valuable as potential business strategies (not as technical outcomes);
but they also remain freighted with uncertainty as to whether consumers will in fact respond favorably to their initiatives. 100
The.end result is that Breeders B and C will tend to avoid
follow-on applications of the green tulip technology, especially if
they require ex ante disclosures to Breeder A, lest Breeder A freeride on their initiatives. Unless Breeders A and B agree to prospect
and develop a red, white, and green tulip together (collectively or
under a licensing arrangement), despite the risk of premature divulgation of B's business idea and/or of his own technical knowhow, the public may not obtain such a tulip, the cycle of cumulative
innovation may be broken, and-carrying matters to an extremeboth Breeders A and B may fail for lack of other commercial successes.

98. Disregarding the enforceability of a nondisclosure agreement in such a case (in the unlikely event Breeder A would sign one), the transaction costs of suing on an agreement covering
such small-scale innovation look prohibitively high. Even if the second comer waits until he has
developed the follow-on technology at the risk of wasting his time if no deal ensues, it could be
hard to parry a claim that Breeder A was already directly or indirectly at work on similar technology, despite the nondisclosure agreement, just because the technical distance between the two
may appear insignificant.
99. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 26, at 1305-06, 1352-54. In the case of "blocking" patents,
the availability of compulsory licenses (under international law, at least) may further facilitate
that outcome by giving Inventors B and C legal incentives (in addition to market incentives) to
develop their technology with or without an ex ante transaction. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 6, art. 311; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the BargainingBreakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 U. TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994); see also Joseph Straus, The
Principle of 'Dependence" Under Patents and Plant Breeders' Rights, 26 INDUS. PROP. 433, 43438 (1987).
100. On this element of uncertainty, see generally Ayers & Klemperer, supra note 91.
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Moreover-and this point is easily overlooked-all other participants in the relevant breeder community are then deprived of
the potential technical benefits that might have flowed from an influx of new investments attendant upon these undertakings or any
commercial success to which they might have led. In other words, if
Breeders B and C decline to invest in follow-on applications because
of Breeder A's powerful hybrid intellectual property right, the rest
of the relevant technical community may also suffer directly or indirectly from the loss of a potential stream of new investments that
was thus prematurely aborted. 101
C. Critique of the Standard Solutions
All of the standard regulatory solutions currently applied to
stimulate investment in fields of small-scale innovation that suffer
from a lack of actual or legal secrecy produce unsatisfactory results.
Moreover, as single countries shift back and forth over time between relatively weak and relatively strong hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights, in response to pressures from different interest groups clamoring about the risks of under- or
overprotection, 0 2 policymakers seldom stop to reconsider the validity of the basic historical models that still control legislative action
10 3
in this regard.
Meanwhile, the often poor and always costly economic performance of these hybrid exclusive property rights profoundly destabilizes the worldwide intellectual property system in ways that

101. For more insights into this problem in the context of patentable inventions and copyrightable works (i.e., large-scale innovations), see generally Geller, supra note 50; Lemley, supra
note 2; Merges & Nelson, supra note 26. This Article takes no position on structural reforms of
patent or copyright laws as such.
102. For details in regard to industrial designs, see Reichman, Design Protection, supra note
33, at 123-26 (identifying pendular swings in United States law); id. at 126-35 (regarding similar
cycles in foreign law).
103. Even when they did pause to look around, there was no alternative sui generis liability
regime articulated as such before the publication of the 'Legal Hybrids," Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, and 'Manifesto," Samuelson, et al., Manifesto, supranote 3, articles in 1994.
There was, however, at least one relevant alternative theory that had emerged, see Kingston,
Thesis Chapters, supra note 3, at 59-86 (building on work of Kronz and finding that innovation
warrants are needed to encourage investment at above average risk). Moreover, the drafters of
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, see supra note 21, had stumbled into a softer,
more copyright-like approach; the drafters of the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right of
1988, supra note 56, had extended that latter approach to both functional and aesthetic designs
generally and had engrafted a liability component as well, in the form of a compulsory license
that kicks in after five years, see, e.g., MAcQUEEN, supranote 17, at 69-80; and there had been at
least one real-world liability regime applicable to technical drawings and construction projects in
Italy since the 1930s, see infra note 149.
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one can only hint at here. The fact that no consensus solution for
resolving the root problem of industrial designs has emerged despite two hundred years of fruitless experimentation with different
admixtures of patent and copyright principles exposes both copyright and trademark laws to severe anticompetitive strains, as
courts and legislators periodically open them up to investors in
three-dimensional product configurations seeking shelter from
slavish imitations. 0 4 The tensions surrounding the legal protection
of both computer programs and biogenetic innovations have been
worsened by the lack of any credible sui generis alternative to correct the manifest defects of stretching the patent and copyright
paradigms beyond their traditional boundaries. 0 5 Most recently,
the prospects of underprotecting computer-generated databases in
copyright law have induced the European Commission to promulgate yet another ill-conceived (and potentially perpetual) hybrid
regime, which threatens to undermine technical progress everywhere by elevating the social costs of generating and accessing sci06
entific and technical information.
As matters stand today, when a proliferation of hybrid sui
generis regimes increasingly provide patent-like protection in exchange for less than 'nonobvious inventions 0 7 (and the European
Commission plans to mandate utility model protection throughout
the Union), 08 the green tulip exercise helps to pinpoint the precise
nature of a flawed economic outcome. The exercise showed that any
patent-like solution will give Breeder A a relatively strong legal
monopoly for undertaking an investment in routine innovation motivated by his own business judgement about market opportunities.
The public will obtain no significant creative contribution in return
for rewarding Breeder A with monopoly rights (and monopoly rents)
to undertake an investment that Breeder A's own business judgement inclined him to make anyway, at least in the absence of intolerable free-riding by second comers. 0 9 While the public stands to

104. See, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 109-12 (regarding the overlap with copyright
law); id. at 402-24 (regarding overlap with unfair competition laws).
105. See generally Kingston, Unlocking, supranote 3.
106. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24, at 84-95, 117-24; Reichman & Uhlir, supra
note 24, at 802-20; see generallyE.C. Directive on Databases, supranote 24.
107. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2453-2504.
108. See Draft E.C. Directive on Utility Models, supra note 35; Janis, supra note 12, at 15355.
109. For the willingness of patent and copyright laws to accept a similar result in return for
a relatively large grain-sized social pay-off (which result is not under attack here), see supra
notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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benefit from the green tulip innovation (despite the tepid initial
consumer response), solving the free-rider problem by misbundling
exclusive property rights imposes burdensome transaction costs on
the relevant technical community, frustrates entrepreneurial initiative, and saddles the public with the social costs of misdirected, topdown incentives that deny equally capable second comers access to
inputs from the public domain." 0
More generally, any system that protects subpatentable applications of technical know-how to industry by means of hybrid
exclusive property rights tends to reward individual creators and
innovators as if they had delivered big grain-sized innovations. In
reality, the individual's qualitative creative contribution over and
above investment will typically be small (despite its potentially
great commercial value) precisely because the relevant community
of plant breeders had already cumulatively shared and sequentially
developed the basic know-how of which the individual contribution
partakes.
None of the hybrid solutions takes account of the community's role in the process of developing subpatentable innovations
through minuscule additions to the common stock of technical
know-how accruing from their combined efforts to work out the prevailing technical trajectories."' Indeed, because they remain perversely structured around hybrid admixtures of patent and copyright principles that recognize only the contributions of individual
creators, these solutions may actually undermine the community's
own interests by artificially restricting access to the public-domain
i2
inputs on which it collectively depends."
Phrased differently, the platform of hybrid intellectual property rights as currently structured lacks any systematic capacity to
promote the needs-especially the investment needs-of the relevant technical community as a whole. Motivated by self-interest,
the members of this community would presumably continue to invest in future applications of their shared technical know-how, with
a concomitant expansion and deepening of that same know-how, but
for the free-rider problem, the attendant risk of market failure, and
the divisive influence of the hybrid exclusive rights elicited to cure

110. Cf. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12; Janis, supranote 12, at 200-15 (same conclusions
for utility model laws); Benkler, supra note 11, at 434-35 (predicting chronic under-utilization of
information). For a trenchant theoretical critique of misusing legal monopolies to such ends, see
generally Boyle, supra note 38.
111. See supra notes 1-3, 26-29 and accompanying text; see generally David & Foray, supra
note 53.
112. Cf. BOYLE, supra note 11, at 155-57; Benkler, supranote 11, at 434-35.
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it. Yet, by rewarding individuals with strong exclusive property
rights for routine applications of the community's technical knowhow to industry, the system tends to make that shared know-how
artificially scarce." 3 It thereby exerts a divisive influence on the
relevant community and elevates the transaction costs of working
through its common, underlying technical trajectory.
On the positive side of the ledger, of course, hybrid exclusive
property rights also attenuate the social costs of market failure by
encouraging investment in routine innovation that might not otherwise take place in the raw state of affairs. This explains the tenacity of utility model laws, which-despite their obvious economic
contradictions-continue to be adopted and are about to become
mandatory in all European Union member countries and their af114
filiates.
In this connection, one should not underestimate either the
social costs of ignoring the cumulative market failure that results
when investors in "incremental innovation bearing know-how on its
face" suffer from a chronic shortage of natural lead time under present-day conditions" 5 or the countervailing social costs that arise
from trying to close this gap in the classical intellectual property
system by expedient admixtures of patent and copyright principles
that tend to over- or underprotect their selected beneficiaries. The
goal is not to achieve a perfect balance in some abstract sense; it is
to preserve the conditions under which perfect competition remains
16
at least a theoretical possibility.
From this angle, we must not lose sight of the fact that competition often drives entrepreneurs to invest in small-scale innovation despite palpable risks of market failure, and the history of design protection law teaches some instructive lessons in this
regard. 1 7 Whenever there exists even the possibility that a desir-

113. Cf. Cohen, supra note 11.
114. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. However, Mark Janis shows that even these
laws are far less stable than is commonly supposed. See Janis, supranote 12, at 199-218.
115. Cf. Gordon, supra note 2; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2330-42; Reichman, Computer Programs,supra note 29, at 656 (stressing extent to which investors in innovative computer programs remain vulnerable to "trivial acquisitions of equivalence").
116. For the capital importance of this point (and other reasons why perfect monopolies are
undesirable), see Boyle, supra note 38; see also PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 120-25 (1996).
117. See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 116, at 121, 124 (stressing information asymmetries that
intellectual property rights introduce); Nimetz, supra note 52. The Italian design industries
have thrived in a relatively pro-competitive environment, rather like that of Silicon Valley; the
lack of multiple layers of legal protection available to their French counterparts has not demonstrably held them back.
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able level of competition might be attained with or without the imposition of hybrid exclusive property rights, the burden of demonstrating lower social costs overall should logically fall on those advocating the imposition of top-down measures that will certainly
diminish access to the public domain and that may do more harm in
the end than would occur if innovators had to take their chances in
118
a "malcompetitive" business environment.
The questions that remain unasked so long as the hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights proliferate like kudzu are
whether solving market failures by such means is truly worth the
candle when all the social costs and benefits are added up, and
whether a different, less individualistic approach might not yield
greater benefits at lower social costs. In the green tulip problem, for
example, we saw that Breeder B's commercial success depended on
his meshing the cumulative state of the community's technical
know-how with his own technical skills and business judgment. Yet,
the legal tools provided by the current intellectual property system
tend to focus solely on Breeder B's initiative, while ignoring the
community's own evolving contribution, even though the success of
Breeder B's initiative does not really depend on his ability to see
beyond the prior art or to prospect a significant technical breakthrough. 1 9
As we have seen, strong contractual rights linked to strong
exclusive property rights in small grain-sized innovations under
these conditions tend to foster new, unnecessary, and perhaps hidden transaction costs, as well as added barriers to entry. Second
comers must negotiate permissions and pay monopoly prices, even
when contemplating risky follow-on innovations of their own, and
even when such follow-on innovation actually vindicates or validates the first comer's own investment. This need to bargain
around an exclusive property right (which often tends to produce
positive outcomes with respect to relatively larger-scale, patented
inventions) 120 perversely complicates routine business transactions
and adds new risks of disclosure (or the costs of defending infringement actions) to the innate risks of predicting market success.

118. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341
(1987); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661 (1999); Robert W. Kastenmeier
& Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm
Ground?, 70 MNN. L. REV. 417, 438-42 (1985) (endorsing views of David Lange); see also
KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 121-212 (elaborating new action of "malign competition"); Gordon, supra note 2, at 222-66 (proposing tort of"malcompetitive copying").
119. Cf. Kitch, supra note 52 (discussing the prospect theory of patent protection).
120. See generally Merges, supranote 26.
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Moreover, these same contracts will tend to clutter the technical
community's otherwise unrestricted field of use and add to all the
participants' costs of doing business with no commensurate gain to
12 1
the public.
Under these conditions, lost opportunity costs will soar, and
decreased competition may force those second comers still willing to
purchase the latest additions to the community's know-how to pay
premium prices. Ironically, these impediments to follow-on innovation, which flow from misguided efforts to cure market failure, occur even though the bulk of the protected innovation derives from
the public domain to which the would-be second comers' own prior
investments had already contributed and even though any member
of the relevant technical community could, in principle, achieve the
same small-scale technical advance at the right time, if and when a
comparable business judgement prompted the initiative.
As tiny bundles of small-scale innovation covered by strong
intellectual property rights and strong contractual rights thus multiply, they divide up, the community's shared know-how into ever
smaller parcels that are withdrawn from the public domain. This
produces a tangled web of property and quasi-property rights that
in itself constitutes a barrier to entry and a disincentive to further
small-scale innovation. 122 The transaction costs of reconstituting
contractually the chain of sequential know-how previously available
from the public domain become correspondingly high and increasingly prohibitive. In the long-run, these hybrid intellectual property
regimes, and the suffocating weed-like thicket of exclusive rights
they breed, threaten to throttle more innovation that they could
ever possibly stimulate.
III. SOLVING THE GREEN TULIP PROBLEM
To arrest the pendular swings between states of chronic under- and overprotection that investors in small-scale innovation increasingly face under present-day conditions, the domestic systems

121. As the results of subpatentable innovation increasingly translate into genomic data or
other information tools, there is a further risk that first comers may magnify their bargaining
power by combining intellectual property rights with standard form electronic contracts and
technical protection measures in ways that further disrupt or discourage routine follow-on inno-

vation. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: ReconcilingFreedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PENN. L.
REV. 875 (1999); infra text accompanying note 187.
122. See generally Benkler, supra note 11; Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note
12; Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 12; Reichman & Franklin, supranote 121.
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of innovation require a new type of intellectual property regime
that would break with the tradition of multiplying hybrid exclusive
rights to address technology-specific instances of potential market
failure. Such a regime must avoid measures that impoverish the
public domain or that otherwise foster legal barriers to entry, while
empowering entrepreneurs to prevent free riders from rapidly appropriating the fruits of their investment in small-scale innovations
without contributing to the costs of development. It must also serve
as a buffer or transitional zone between the mature patent and
copyright paradigms, on the one hand, and unbridled competition
23
on the other.1
A general purpose innovation law meeting these criteria can
be built on modified liability principles. This law should entitle investors to compensatory contributions to defray their R&D costs
from second comers who borrowed the resulting subpatentable
know-how for industrial applications of their own during a specified
period of time. It would not, however, endow small-scale innovators
with an exclusive right to control such uses. 124 In what follows, I
summarize the tenets of this proposal and show how, by combining
the right set of legal incentives to invest with the benefits of free
competition, a liability regime could resolve the dilemmas facing
the green tulip protagonists and all similarly situated investors.
A. Mechanics of a Compensatory Liability Regime
To achieve the desired goals, the proposed compensatory liability scheme requires a basic set of default rules that obligate
second comers to pay equitable compensation for borrowed improvements over a relatively short period of time. 25 With reference
to the green tulip hypothetical, for example, we saw that Breeder
A's main complaint in the raw state of affairs was that Breeders B

123. Rather than increasing competition with few social costs, as nineteenth century legal
and economic tenets predict, a legislative decision to expose today's most valuable forms of subpatentable innovation to unbridled competition (with no intermediate zone to buffer the shocks)
would simply reinforce the cyclical movement between chronic states of under- and overprotection that characterize the present impasse. History demonstrates that the end result of this
process may be less, not more, competition than would have occurred under an appropriate
buffer regime. See, e.g., Reichman, Design Protection,supranote 33, at 123-35.
124. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2529-57.
125. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2533-39; cf. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoringof ContractualRules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4 (1993)
(distinguishing "off-the-rack" default rules applicable to all parties from "tailored" default rules
that are more contextual); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory
of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
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and C could swiftly turn the subpatentable know-how resulting
from A's investment into commercially successful follow-on products
without contributing to the underlying costs of development that
had yielded a green tulip in the first instance.
Breeder A could not properly lodge any patent or copyright
claims because the green tulip did not qualify either as a nonobvious invention or as an original work of authorship. Yet, because his
innovative know-how was embodied in the green tulip variety itself,
which any other breeder could purchase and reproduce, Breeders B
and C could move immediately into adjacent market segments
without incurring any significant R&D costs of their own, as regards the underlying innovation. If the green tulip had scored a
commercial success on its own merits, moreover, Breeders B and C
might have captured that initial market segment as well, because
they had lower costs and Breeder A would have obtained no natural
lead time from actual secrecy or from the operations of trade secret
law.
1. A Functional Substitute for Natural Lead Time
My proposal responds to this dilemma by providing a functional substitute for the chronic lack of natural lead time that afflicts today's investors in small-scale innovation. It entitles Breeder
A to a specified period of artificial lead time during which the use of
his innovative "green tulip" know-how requires compensation but
not authorization. 126 If, during the specified period of time, Breeder
B borrows Breeder A's innovative know-how, he must compensate
Breeder A according to the formulas discussed below, 127 which are
aimed at roughly measuring the value added to B's products by the
features or components borrowed from Breeder A. 128 In this way,

Breeder B would contribute directly to Breeder A's costs of R&D.
Let me emphasize that while Breeder A would thus obtain
some legal entitlement, his entitlement operates as a true liability
rule and not as an exclusive property right. The whole idea is to
recreate some functional equivalent of the natural lead time that
once made competition with respect to most forms of subpatentable

126. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2547-48.
127. The formulas used in the case of head-to-head competition on the initial market seg-

ment may differ from those used in cases of follow-on applications. See infra text accompanying
notes 148-53, 166-71.
128. This rough benchmark is refined in practice by other considerations that greatly reduce
both the level of compensation and transaction costs. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53,
169-71.
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innovation feasible. 129 Thus, Breeder A does not have the right to
hold out: Breeder B need not seek Breeder A's permission to make
use of his green tulip variety, and Breeder A cannot deter second
comers from borrowing that small-scale innovation so long as they
remain willing to pay and the term of protection has not expired.
Follow-on innovation is further encouraged because the operative period of legal liability must be short. If Breeder B remains
patient and waits until that period expires, he may use the green
tulip variety without payment as an input from the public domain.
Moreover, an impatient Breeder B who possesses sufficient technical know-how of his own can independently generate a green tulip,
and need not compensate Breeder A at all. 10 In that case, there
would be no free-riding. On the contrary, Breeder B's application of
that technique to the red, white, and green variety will then further
contribute to the relevant technical community's aggregate investment in R&D, which presumably enabled both Breeders A and B to
innovate in the first place.
Breeders C are treated like Breeder B. They remain free to
extend Breeder B's improved red, white, and green variety to other
follow-on products without seeking authorization. Any rapid borrowing of the claimed technical know-how pertinent to either the
green tulip or the red, white, and green variant during the terms in
which Breeder A's and Breeder B's rights are protected will, however, require Breeders C to compensate both Breeders A and B according to the applicable formulas."'1 If some of the breeders who
fall in category C wait until Breeder A's rights have expired, they
need to compensate only Breeder B, and then only for the added
value to their products of his specific contribution."32 If all of the

Breeders in category C waited long enough, or if they all demonstrably generated follow-on varieties by dint of their own investments in the relevant R&D without borrowing protected know-how,
none of them would become liable to Breeders A or B.
The element of free-riding is attenuated in all these cases by
the obligation to contribute to the underlying costs of R&D either
directly by compensation or indirectly by regenerating the know-

129. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
130. Here, of course, Breeder B benefits from the knowledge that Breeder A has solved the
problem, but not from a taking of the technical solution itself
131. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2529-44.
132. A less aggressive, more workable formula would apply in practice. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
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how in question with likely improvements. 13 3 If neither Breeders B
nor C borrow the small grain-sized innovation within the applicable
period of liability and accordingly pay nothing at all to Breeder A,
the latter will nonetheless have benefited from a period of artificial
lead time in which to emulate Breeder B's red, white, and green
variety and Breeder C's other successful follow-on products.
Whether Breeder A generates these competing products by virtue of
his own independent efforts, without compensating Breeders B or
C, or opts instead quickly to borrow back their improvements with a
payment of compensatory liability depends entirely on A's business
judgement and technical capacity. However, his decisions cannot be
skewed by B's or C's refusal to authorize competing small-scale innovations for lengthy periods of time under top-down exclusive
property rights.
This system does retain some residual element of free-riding:
at the expiration of a relatively short period of protection, each
breeder's small-scale innovation will lapse into the public domain
where all competitors remain free to use it without incurring compensatory liability. But this is precisely what free competition entails. In a healthy competitive environment, any second comer can
access any subpatentable innovation for purposes of reverseengineering the underlying process of manufacture by proper
means, because the time and money required to accomplish the task
of reverse-engineering overcomes the inherent risk of market failure. 134 It is only in an environment in which incremental innovation
bears the entrepreneur's know-how on (or near) its face-where the
costs of reverse engineering are negligible-that a problem arises.
The proposed compensatory liability regime would solve it by imposing functionally equivalent costs: it channels funds that might
otherwise have been spent on the second comer's task of reverseengineering directly to defray the first mover's real costs of R&D.
If Breeders B and C choose to wait out the period of protection and thus make no compensatory liability payments, they stand
in the shoes of "healthy" competitors, whose only barriers to entry
are natural lead time and the state of the art available to all other

133. Cf., e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (adopting Raskind's position); Leo J. Raskind, Reverse Engineering,Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MiNN. L. REV. 385, 402 (1985) (stressing the importance of improvements
in establishing defense of lawful reverse engineering under Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (1994)).
134. Cf. Friedman et al., supranote 12, at 67-70 (stressing benefits of shared know-how and
likelihood of improvements).
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routine engineers. Their autonomous investments in small-scale
innovations that improve existing products (and strengthen their
own competitive prospects) will then redound to the benefit of the
entire technical community. This follows because, even though on
this scenario they owe nothing to Breeder A, all other breeders who
share the common stock of technical know-how (including Breeder
A) are themselves free to borrow back any new incremental additions to subpatentable know-how that patient Breeders B and C
may contribute in return for equitable contributions to their respective costs of R&D within the applicable period of liability.
2. Implementing a Liability Rule
I have elsewhere outlined a legal framework for implementing a general purpose innovation law along these lines, which Professor Samuelson and I have referred to as a "modified liability regime", and which I now prefer to call a "compensatory liability regime." 135 Our previous work suggested that such a regime would
benefit from the constitutive elements set out below.
a. Main Features
Some of these elements are fairly straight forward. First,
there must be a subject matter denomination of the protectable
bundles of commercially valuable information, which we call an
"industrial compilation." Second, the regime will need a flexible
standard of novelty more or less equivalent to that which courts
apply in trade secrecy cases. A third element is the period of artificial lead time available to entrepreneurs claiming protection for
any given "industrial compilation." 136 A fourth element is a national
registration system for making these claims known, whose operations might be facilitated by online technologies and by reliance on
designated agents for specific industries in many cases. Mediatory
dispute and arbitral settlement arrangements should also be built
13
into the system.
In principle, a compensatory liability regime would thus be
crafted in general terms, so as to accommodate small-scale innovation from all sectors of industry. One advantage of this approach,

135. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2544-57 (In Search of a Community-Wide
Know-How Transaction"); Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supranote 3, at 2426-29.
136. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2326-30.
137. For details, see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2544-48, 2551, 2555-57.
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however, is that, over time, codified variants might be tailored to
meet the needs of particular industries; e.g., a database protection
law could benefit from certain structural nuances not needed for
the bulk of subpatentable innovation without gutting the liability
regime as a whole. 138 In this and other respects, the compensatory
liability regime constitutes a "third intellectual property paradigm,"
whose basic principles can be systematically developed without undermining the operations of the patent and copyright laws within
their traditional spheres of influence. 13 9
Other constituent elements of a compensatory liability regime would include criteria for infringement; remedies that distinguished between slavish copying and the provision of a menu of users' liabilities for follow-on innovation; 140 a list of defenses, including misuse; and rules governing the relations between this regime
and other laws, particularly unfair competition law.' 4 ' Some of
these issues are amplified below.
b. Infringement
An implementing statute should set out the applicable standard of infringement, and I have elsewhere endorsed a "substantial
identity" criterion for this purpose. 142 However, the underlying purpose of a liability rule that requires payment of equitable contributions to the costs of development from which the later innovator
benefited should affect the way courts apply that standard. They
must ensure that virtually any use of a qualitatively or quantitatively significant component within the specified term of protection
143
would "infringe" in the sense of triggering that duty to pay.

138. Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24, at 145-51 ("A Modified Liability Approach").
139. See, e.g., Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse, supra note 6, at 511, fig. 4 CThe Legal Hy-

brids as a Potentially Autonomous Entity"); id. at 517-20 ('Need for a New Intellectual Property
Paradigm"); see generally, Symposium, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2307, 2559-2677 (1994).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 151-57, 169-71.
141. Also desirable is the encouragement of sectoral agents (or quasi-collection societies) on
an industry by industry basis, which would facilitate collective action on licensing, dispute resolution, and ancillary rule-making procedures of interest to particular sectors. See Reichman,
Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2544-57; cf. Merges, supranote 26.
142. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2399-2401 (favoring substantial identity test for software and industrial compilations); see also Raskind, supra note 133, at 398-402
(tracing legislative history of this test in context of § 906 of the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984).
143. Cf. E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 24, art. 8 (adopting a "quantitative or qualitative" component test, but within the ambit of an ultra high-protectionist exclusive property
right).
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Some difficulties in proving "use" might arise, especially in
countries where opportunities for discovery are sparse, although
the small scale of the innovation at issue and the brevity of the liability period should help to alleviate such problems. At bottom,
once a complainant satisfies a "substantial identity" test with respect to the accused technology or component thereof, the burden
should shift to the defendant. The latter can then try to rebut this
presumption of use by producing evidence of independent developruent. 1' Codifying the relative burdens of proof in such cases is a
good idea,' 45 for which there are analogies in existing law. 14 Moreover, a mandatory requirement of arbitration (and even mediation)
for disputes should help to avoid litigation in most cases by focusing
the parties' attention on their options under the menu of users' li147
abilities.
c. Compensatory Remedies' 48
In theory, a liability rule could objectively require every user
to contribute a proportionate share of the R&D costs from which he
benefited or to pay the value that the borrowed fruits of this investment added to his or her own products. This rule seems consistent with the goal of defraying a first comer's costs, and it would
also integrate some unjust enrichment principles into the framework. 149 Such a rule could, however, be difficult to implement. 50 A
better alternative would be to require the parties to negotiate,

144. Cf. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994)).
145. I am indebted to Professor Rochelle C. Dreyfuss for this idea.
146. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 34 (shifting burden of proof for products
obtained by patented processes).
147. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2548-51, 2555-57.
148. These remedies apply to follow-on innovations, which is the primary concern here. For
remedies applicable to slavish imitation, including injunctions, see infra text accompanying
notes 169-71.
149. Cf. Gordon, supra note 2. This is the calculus used in the sole existing liability regime
that operates somewhat along the lines of the compensatory liability regime discussed here. Cf.
Italian Copyright Law, No. 633 of April 22, 1941, as amended through 29, 1989, Art. 99. See
PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, ITALY, § 8[2][d][vi]
(1999) (use of engineering projects that constitute original solutions of technical problems);
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supranote 7, at 2477-78.
150. Procedural complications are easy to conjure up if plaintiffs had to identify many users
and join them all in a single lawsuit, or if defendants held liable in one case sought contributions
from others. In my proposal, however, all the industry players now know they must pay for use;
the relevant scale of innovation is small; the period is short; and experience shows that an industry-approved standard-form contract administered by an authorized agent works well and would
tend to reduce overall transaction costs. Cf Merges, supra note 26, at 1311 (discussing Harry
Fox licenses under 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994)).
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bearing in mind that arbitration would become mandatory if negotiations failed and that, because the parties operate under a liability rule, plaintiff could not simply refuse to license. 151 This system
could be made more manageable and efficient by reducing the duty
to compensate to a set of royalties levied on a fixed percentage of
the offender's gross revenues that varied within a specified range of
options.
For example, a three-pronged sliding scale of royalty options
could simple-mindedly distinguish between small, medium, and
large contributions to added value that entailed corresponding duties to pay. 152 A slightly more refined system might recognize a
fourth category applicable to an "extra large" quantum of technical
know-how added (without authorization) to the follow-on product in
question. Whether these percentage options should fall into a modest range (say, 3%-6%-9%) or into a range with more bite (say 5%10%-15% or higher) is an issue best deferred to more empirical in153
vestigation.
A number of factors combine to make this approach (or, in
default, an arbitrator's decision to the same effect) more socially
desirable than a nominally more serious assessment of the real
value added in single cases. First, by insisting that Breeder B share
in the costs of Breeder A's R&D, we are intentionally structuring a
de facto legal partnership arrangement embracing all the members
of the relevant technical community. One goal is to ensure that this
partnership arrangement outperforms the zig-zag, hit-or-miss decisions that result when courts use unfair competition laws to fill
gaps in the domestic intellectual property systems. As work on patent pools demonstrates, 15 4 a sliding scale of percentage royalties
expresses this venture partnership principle (and the sharing of
scientific and technical information that it implies).
A second reason for preferring a relatively uncomplicated
scale of percentage royalties is that, even if we were serious about

151. See supra notes 124, 126-30 and accompanying text.
152. Even so, second comers like Breeder B in the green tulip example might want to quarrel
with Breeder A about whether the latter was entitled to a relatively "large," "medium," or "small"
percentage of Breeder B's revenues from sales of his red, white, and green tulip, given that the
valuation of Breeder A's prior technical inputs (into a commercially unsuccessful green tulip)
must also take account of the cost of Breeder B's own technical inputs (into a successful red,
white, and green tulip) as well as the value of his superior marketing skills. In this scheme,
failure to agree on this issue would be taken up by the arbitrator.
153. Paul Geller suggests a possible benchmark based on the fair market license fee that
technical information would fetch if it had been kept secret.
154. See Robert P. Merges, Institutionsfor Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
PatentPools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 12.

2000]

GREEN TULIPS

1785

quantifying real value added to follow-on innovation, the single
source of greatest value added to any small-scale innovation is always the public domain. In the green tulip exercise, for example,
the bulk of the value resides in the common store of plant breeders'
know-how (or in this case, of specific tulip breeding know-how) that
Breeders A, B, and C share in common with all the other breeders
at work on the existing technical trajectory. Any of these breeders
can freely make use of any of the cumulative and sequential innovations that enrich the public domain without owing any dues to
anybody.
If, on top of this giant, Breeder A's green tulip technique
adds a new and commercially valuable fragment to that common
store of knowledge, it is fitting that Breeders B and C contribute a
tangential percentage of the revenues resulting from exploitation of
that fragment in recognition of Breeder A's real costs of R&D. But
given the preponderant weight of the public-domain layer in all
small-scale applications of know-how to industry, we do not want
the compensatory mechanism to undervalue the technical community's own contribution to every follow-on innovation. From this angle, a sliding scale of relatively modest percentage royalties expresses the concept of floating, de facto "partnerships" that arise
within the framework of a compensatory liability rule, while respecting the shared ownership of the commons that unites all those
155
engaged in technical and scientific pursuits.
The small scale of allowable percentages would also discourage resort to arbitration or appeal of the results of arbitration to
the courts. Moreover, because most of the relevant players in the
different sectors of industry are likely to alternate as both borrowers and lenders of subpatentable innovation over time, their mutual
self interest pushes toward accommodations that both lenders and
156
borrowers can live with at any time.
Finally, a preference for a set of modest percentage royalties
over other more aggressive valuation methods harmonizes with the
principle that the period during which any borrower remains liable
for equitable contributions to the costs of R&D should be short in
an absolute sense. This follows because the primary purpose of the

155. Such percentages, though sometimes yielding lower returns than what might be gained
under exclusive property rights, see infra text accompanying notes 182-86, are thus in no sense
"suboptimal' from the perspective of either the technical community or that of the public at
large. Because the only innovation at issue is small grain-sized and subpatentable by definition,
these are the only perspectives that count under the circumstances.
156. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2535-36; cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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proposed default rules is to overcome the chronic shortage of natural lead time under present-day conditions, and not to create legal
157
monopolies or other incentives to invest where none are needed.
One should also emphasize that the transaction costs of implementing the proposed set of default rules need not prove onerous or
burdensome precisely because only a finite number of industry
players are ever involved at any given time, and the system focuses
mainly on payments and adjustments between players on given
market segments.
d. Defenses
In practice, once a compensatory liability regime was legislatively set in motion, parties opting into the system would normally
prefer to strike their own bargains while treating the baseline
statutory entitlements as a point of reference for this and other
purposes, including litigation. The ex-ante disclosure problem that
hinders deal-making between Breeders A and B under present-day
conditions, for example, would give way to an environment in which
both parties (and all other industry players) knew that Breeders B
and C could legally apply Breeder A's green tulip know-how to follow-on products so long as they paid their compensatory dues.
In many ways, this propensity to deal is a major benefit of
the proposal. Experience suggests that industry-approved standardform contracts, perhaps administered by a single authorized agent,
may develop, and these would further tend to reduce overall transaction costs. 158 If public, such deals will 'also furnish data about the
industry's own valuations of follow-on innovations, which arbitrators could use in contested cases. Actual experience could eventually lead legislatures to modify the initial statutory entitlements to
more accurately reflect these bargained-for results.
Facilitating transactions among competitors also raises the
danger of anticompetitive agreements, such as agreements that unduly benefited, say, Breeders A, B, and C at the expense of those
who would buy their tulips or who would enter the market as their
potential competitors. It seems advisable, therefore, to include in
the statute a list of anticompetitive acts that would furnish a de-

157. Conceivably, a statutory set of default rules could establish both a minimum and a
maximum period of liability, and allow different industries some flexibility in adopting or adjusting their own liability periods within the statutorily allowed range. Cf. Kingston, Thesis
Chapters, supranote 3, at 1-87.
158. Cf. Merges, supra note 26; see infra text accompanying notes 187-88.
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fense to infringement actions, along with codified standards of misuse that would further clarify the limits of privately negotiated contracts arising under the compensatory liability regime. 159 An accompanying series of safe harbors should likewise provide entrepreneurs with guidance about types of agreements that are considered to promote innovation and competition.160
e. Relationship to Unfair Competition Laws
Although the proposed compensatory liability regime should
obviate the need for other sui generis intellectual property rights to
protect subpatentable innovation, some doctrines of unfair competition law should retain their vitality. The first is trade secret law:
nothing should impede any entrepreneurs capable of keeping all or
part of their subpatentable innovations secret from taking their
chances under trade secret law. The innovators' lead-time calculus
would then vary with the second comers' abilities to reverse engineer the process underlying the relevant products by honest
means. 16' If such an entrepreneur declined to use trade secret protection and opted into the compensatory liability system, he or she
would be wagering that the potential returns accruing from its period of artificial lead time would exceed expected earnings under a
162 Of
variable (and disappearing) period of natural lead time.
course, few investors will actually enjoy the luxury of such a choice,
given that the impetus for this proposal was the chronic shortage of
natural lead time that afflicts investments in so many of today's
most commercially valuable applications of know-how to industry.
General norms of unfair competition law that, in some countries, prompt courts to take action against "slavish imitation" or
"cparasitical copying" are a different matter, 163 and they should lose

159. Cf. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. § 106 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-350, pt. 1 (1999) (proposing
database protection law on unfair competition principles and setting out detailed standards for
application of a misuse defense).
160. The misuse provision could itself codify a "sword of Damocles" clause, which would intrinsically validate the bulk of contractual transactions while establishing heavier burdens of
justification on rights holders who forced competitors into potentially unreasonable terms and
conditions. See generally Reichman & Franklin, supra note 121, at 929-38 (proposing publicinterest unconscionability doctrine that would "validate non-negotiable terms that respect the
balance of public and private interests"); see also id. at 951-70 ('A Non-Assent Driven Paradigm
of Contract Formation for the Digital Age").
161. See, e.g., UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 17, §§ 39-45.
162. See, e.g., John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OiO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962) (characterizing
trade secret rights as a "disappearing righe').
163. See KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 24-78; supra note 82.
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much of their appeal with the enactment of a compensatory liability
regime. The notion that unfair competition law constitutes "a third
intellectual property paradigm"' 64 that can itself alleviate the investment dilemmas attributed to the phenomenon of incremental
innovation bearing know-how on its face is historically anachronistic and empirically untenable.
Historically, unfair competition law constitutes an amorphous "urground," or basic set of principles that identify and try to
rectify recurring patterns of market-destructive behavior. These
very principles led to the codification of patent and copyright laws,
but they also led to the epicycles of the hybrid regimes. These regimes are enacted precisely because unfair competition norms provide no firm ground for resolving the tensions between the need for
incentives to create and the realities of competition with respect to
165
small-scale innovations.
Empirically, unfair competition norms enable courts to adopt
temporary measures to alleviate the tensions that arise from gaps
in the domestic systems of innovation. Over time, however, when
legislatures fail to intervene (or when they choose to intervene
inopportunely), courts applying these amorphous principles of unfair competition law to deep-rooted problems of small-scale innovation tend to become part of the problem rather than agents of any
real solution. 66

164. Dennis S. Kaijala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2594 (1994); see also KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 113-15.
165. Principles sounding in pure misappropriation doctrines paper over an inherent contradiction between nineteenth century tenets of free competition, which treat product simulation as
an unmitigated blessing, and the chronic shortage of natural lead time under late twentieth
century competitive conditions, which goad courts into treating product simulation as "parasitical copying." Between these two extremes, neither ethical homilies about "reaping where one
has not sewn" or the helpful economic literature concerning market failure, see Gordon, supra
note 2; C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretationof the MisappropriationDoctrine: Common
Law Protectionfor Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH L.J. 55 (1987), supplies a valid and
workable solution. See Leo J. Raskind, The MisappropriationDoctrineas a Competitive Norm of
IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875, 896-905 (1991).
166. At least one heroic effort was made in the Swiss unfair competition law of 1985 to establish a basis for prohibiting slavish imitation of new technologies until the investor had a reasonable chance to recoup his or her investment, but courts have balked at applying these provisions. KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 65; Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at
2474-76. The belief that murky notions of "unjust enrichment' and restitution theory will solve
the deep-rooted problems of small-scale innovation better than the Swiss unfair competition law
(codifying a well-meaning and well-thought out proposal of the late Professor Alois Troller) is
misguided. But see KAMPERMAN SANDERS, supra note 17, at 121-54 (extolling virtues of unjust
enrichment theory and "shaping a new action of malign competition"); Gordon, supra note 2;
Karijala, supranote 164. Worse yet, the failure of general principles of unfair competition law to
solve these deep-rooted problems makes it easier for special interest lobbies to convert wellgrounded fears of market failure into ill-conceived hybrid exclusive property rights that gradu-
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Inevitably, judicial decisions about slavish imitation are ad
hoc and prompted by the judges' own views about the morality of
copying and the importance of free competition. As contradictory,
zig-zag decisions pile up, the cyclical tensions between over- and
underprotection in unfair competition law itself become a tell-tale
sign that the prevailing intellectual property system has once again
failed to come to grips with the real problems afflicting investment
in small grain-sized applications of know-how to industry. 167 The
persistence of these problems, in turn, sets the stage for yet another
round of legislative experiments with sui generis regimes of exclusive property rights, which are likely to repeat the cycle of underand overprotection with even greater anti-competitive effects along
the way. 168 The compensatory liability regime explored in this Article aims to improve upon the historical failure of unfair competition
laws to solve the puzzle of small-scale innovation while avoiding
recourse to hybrid exclusive property rights that seldom do better
than unfair competition laws and that cumulatively undermine the
competitive ethos.
There is, nonetheless, at least one point where the principles
of both approaches-unfair competition and compensatory liability-properly converge. Here I refer to the situation in which the
second comer rapidly appropriates the innovator's small grain-sized
technical contribution in order to compete head to head in the same
market segment, without producing any value-adding product. In

ally suffocate competition. The legislative history of the E.C. Directive on Databases is especially
instructive in this regard. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24, at 80-95.
167. The most recent example of this phenomenon in United States law occurred after 1976,
when Congress failed to enact a sui generis design law and the federal appellate courts began
religiously to protect three-dimensional product configurations as unregistered marks (in perpetuity) under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. By the 1990s, the cumulative anti-competitive
weight of this "most protectionist design law of them all," Reichman, Design Protection, supra
note 33, at 100-23, had induced the same federal appellate courts to reverse direction by overruling these precedents and thus to reestablish the chronic state of underprotection that had
previously prevailed, see, e.g., id.
168. A recent example is design protection laws for boat hulls, which were enacted by state
legislatures, struck down by the Supreme Court, and then reenacted (in even stronger form) by
the federal government, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32 (1994); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). The bankruptcy of these solutions is shown in the fact that the
so-called "harmonized" European Community design proposals could allow overlapping protection among nine or more different regimes, viz, unregistered Community design right; registered
Community design right; national registered design rights; national copyright protection
(France, Benelux); U.K. unregistered design right; Community trade mark protection; national
trade mark protection; national unfair competitions laws; and the proposed Community Directive on Utility Models. See SUTHERSANEN, supra note 16, at 80; cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1962) (explaining the role of pre-Copernican
epicycles)
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terms of the green tulip exercise, this presupposes the situation in
which Breeder A's green tulip would actually have scored a commercial success and, by appropriating the relevant technical knowhow without incurring the costs of R&D, Breeder B undersells
Breeder A and captures the market for green tulips as such (as well
as adjacent market segments for follow-on varieties).
This is the one situation in which it makes sense for a compensatory liability regime to undertake a more aggressive calculus
of the real value added to Breeder B's product by his rapid duplication of Breeder A's technical contribution. Even here, however,
there are other ways of addressing the underlying threat of market
failure from a compensatory liability angle that may better respect
the common public-domain denominator of both products and that
may better preserve the benefits of competition than would a resort
to murky principles of unjust enrichment.
A relatively simple solution, for example, is to codify measures that block Breeder B's ability to undertake this act of wholesale or slavish imitation in the same market segment for a fixed
period of artificial lead time, after which head-to-head competition
may be allowed without any further duty to make compensatory
contributions to R&D. On this approach, Breeder B could not just
169
duplicate the green tulip variety for, say, a period of three years,
even through his value-addingoperations remained permissible but
170
subject to compensatory liability payments.
The advantages of this solution are its low transaction costs
and its neutral impact on follow-on innovation. However, it tends to
slow the pace of direct competition and further to skew the benefits
of such competition by imposing a relatively long blocking period
that lacks any firm empirical foundation. Another, more refined
way to address the problem is to reduce the prohibition against
wholesale duplication for purposes of head-to-head competition to
such a short blocking period that it could withstand any critical
economic evaluation, while requiring the second comer to pay compensatory contributions to the costs of R&D for the remainder of a
specified period of artificial lead time. For example, if the statute

169. Cf. Japanese Unfair Competition Act, Law No. 47/1993, May 19, 1993, § 2(3) (codifying
such a bright-line approach); Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2475. The Italian design
law of 1941, supra note 149, first recognized a three-year lead-time period of exclusive protection,
which gave way to a fifteen-year term in 1977.
170. In other words, there could be an exception to the liability regime that permits an injunction against parasitical copying. This contrasts with the property rules used to protect largegrain-sized creations, which sometimes give way to exceptions. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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blocked Breeder B's wholesale duplication of the green tulip for,
say, one year, his delayed entry into that market segment by such
means could be followed by a subsequent period of, let us say, two
years, in which compensatory liability payments remained obligatory.
Here, moreover, the calculus of those contributions could arguably have still more bite, to reflect the fact that there is no valueadding operation that redounds to the benefit of the technical community as a whole. This can be achieved either by imposing a
higher percentage royalty than would ever apply in a case of followon innovation, by extending the period of compensatory liability
beyond that applicable to follow-on innovation, or by some combination of the two.1 71 For example, after a one-year blocking period,

Breeder B's wholesale duplication of Breeder A's green tulip might
bear a higher percentage royalty than that applicable to follow-on
innovation, and the duty to pay it might last for a longer term than
that governing the case of follow-on applications (say, four years
rather than three). In any event, the mere threat of such regulatory
sanctions should encourage greater reliance on negotiated transactions to resolve conflicts over acts of slavish imitation, like those
envisioned earlier for follow-on innovations.
B. Implications of a Compensatory Liability Regime
I believe that the compensatory liability regime outlined
above would solve the "green tulip" problem and make it unnecessary to enact more hybrid exclusive property rights to address the
problem of market failure in the technology-specific fashion of the
past. However, one could conceivably achieve similar results outside of the intellectual property system as such, for example, by
rooting the proposed default rules in contract law or in trade regulation law. 172 What matters is not the specific legal regime chosen to
implement the proposal, but rather the end result: namely, a set of
off-the-rack liability rules allocating contributions to the costs of
R&D for unauthorized uses of subpatentable innovations within a
specified period of time.
In this context, a paramount consideration is that any new
approach to the puzzle of small-scale innovation should focus on the
relevant technical community as a whole and not on the individual
innovator, whose inducement to invest hinges on market171. Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 24, at 145-47.
172. Cf., e.g., Mackaay, supra note 43.
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determined variables rather than on the need to overcome exceptionally high technical barriers. 178 If the risk of market failure that
collectively discouraged investment in small-scale innovation were
otherwise attenuated, it should suffice to free individual entrepreneurs operating within the relevant technical communities to follow
their own business instincts-i.e., to make pro-competitive business
decisions about the direction of such investments-without the spur
of ad hoc legal monopolies. Conversely, the growth of any given
technical community's store of shared know-how in the absence of
balkanizing exclusive property rights depends on a continuing and
adequate flow of investment across the given field of endeavor,
which serves to nourish the innovative activities of single players
as their needs arise.
This investment model differs from that applicable to large
grain-sized innovation (especially patentable inventions), in which
context a major technical advance by any single player tends to elevate the level of competition as a whole 174 and to redirect the flow of
investment to new objectives 175 that ought to lie beyond the scope of
the prior art. 17 6 In what follows, I will attempt to clarify the deeper
implications of my approach to small-scale innovation in light of the
findings derived from the green tulip exercise that were set out
above.

173. If the technical community required the solution of an exceptionally hard problem in order to progressively develop the prevailing technical trajectories, that would justify awarding full
patent protection to the individual inventor who solved the problem, according to the traditional
rationales for a patent system. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 52; Oddi, supra note 52. While the
difficulty of the problem to be solved could thus, in principle, also justify a reward cast in terms
of hybrid exclusive property rights (e.g. a utility model law), I remain skeptical of attempts to
parse innovation qualitatively below the line of demarcation with nonobviousness. The point of
this and related articles is to show the need for a different kind of approach. Accord Janis, supra
note 12, at 71-76. So long as what is at issue is minimally novel, but less so than a judge requires of a patentable invention, my regime saves it from free-riding with less than patent remedies. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 31 (criticizing use of patent remedies to protect business-method
software).
174. See Lehmann, The Theory of PropertyRights, supranote 17; Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property,supra note 17; see also Merges & Nelson, supranote 26.
175. See generally Kitch, supra note 52 (stressing importance of recognizing the role of the
individual in patent law).
176. In practice, the level of nonobviousness drops lower and lower, and has perhaps touched
bottom in recent patents on business methods. See, e.g., State Street Bank and Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Merges, supra note 31; Dreyfuss,
supra note 31; cf. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. The
establishment of the proposed compensatory liability regime ought quickly to enable courts concerned about free-riders to restore the nonobviousness standard to more traditional levels. See
also infra text accompanying notes 187-88.
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1. Amplifying Investment without Impoverishing the Public
Domain
Within the relevant community of small grain-sized innovators at work on a common technical trajectory, 177 all the players can
add to the cumulative stock of know-how at different times by dint
of their individual business decisions, and each is likely to operate
as either a lender or a borrower of incremental innovation at different times or intervals. So long as the stock of shared know-how continues to grow, today's innovator who borrows another's subpatentable technical innovation tomorrow in order to meet and trump the
evolving state of competition periodically injects both investment
and knowledge into an ongoing community-wide enterprise. 178 The
proper goal of a reformed intellectual property system is mainly to
inhibit second comers operating within the confines of given technical trajectories from free-riding by obliging them to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the first comers' costs of R&D. These costs
have facilitated the second comers' specific follow-on innovation and
have also produced a small, incremental addition to the cumulative
stock of shared technical know-how, which potentially benefits all
firms operating in the same market segment.
However, one should not confuse the second comers' duty to
pay compensation under this approach with the compensatory duties that arise when compulsory licenses derogate from the patentee's (or the copyright owner's) legal monopoly under existing intellectual property systems. 17 9 Compulsory licenses cut back on proprietary control in order to promote certain overriding public interest goals, and the rationale for imposing them remains inherently
controversial. 8 0 In contrast, the "automatic license" that, under my
proposal, 18 1 entitles an investor to compensatory liability for followon applications by second comers during a specified period of time

177. See supra note 1.
178. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, at 2544.
179. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 31 (universal rules for compulsory licenses on
patents); cf. Berne Convention, supra note 19, arts. llbis, 14bis, Appendix, incorporated by reference into TRIPS Agreement, art. 9 (universal rules for compulsory licenses on certain literary
and artistic works).
180. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 9 (preferring not to weaken strong property rules, even in
the face of high transaction costs). However, Merges later extols the Harry Fox licensing solution, see Merges, supra note 26, which to my mind, arose precisely to facilitate bargaining around
a liability rule that was subsequently engrafted onto an exclusive property right. To set the
record straight once again, this Article takes no position on the desirability (or lack of it) of superimposing liability rules onto the patent and copyright subsystems as such.
181. Cf. Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 3, at 2414-15.
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fully expresses the entitlement in question and does not constitute
an artificial limitation upon an exclusive property right.
As I conceive it, the power to control follow-on applications of
subpatentable innovation (as distinct from an entitlement to equitable compensation for certain uses) is simply not a constituent feature of an intellectual property regime based on modified liability
principles. I stress, nonetheless, that the first comer's entitlement
to compensation, although weaker than the corresponding exclusive
property rights that the patent and copyright paradigms afford,
remains an entitlement: correctly perceived, it is an entitlement that
takes the form of an automatic license without the power to
18 2
exclude.
One should not assume that, despite the comparative weakness of the proposed liability regime, a right holder would necessarily collect a lesser stream of revenue from follow-on applications
of protected small-scale innovation than that right holder would
obtain if some hybrid exclusive property right covered the same innovation. The very power to exclude unlicensed follow-on applications often pits the first corner's interest in preserving a legal or
factual monopoly against the second comer's business instincts regarding potentially profitable applications. 1 83 As the "green tulip"
problem illustrates, an aggressive second comer's applications-if
freely allowed subject to a compensatory liability rule-might yield
far more in overall income than the first comer would have obtained
if he or she had denied the license or granted it exclusively to a
more congenial licensee. 8 4 This possibility of unexpected returns
arises especially when several second comers become interested in
multiple follow-on applications that could produce a cumulative
"lottery effect" well in excess of what the first corner's own business
plan might otherwise have yielded. In the green tulip exercise, for
example, a potential lottery payout was portrayed when other
breeders (Breeders B and C), having incorporated the first breeder's
(Breeder A's) technical innovation into novel tulips with multiple
color combinations, became subject to compensatory royalties. 8 5

182. I am indebted to Professor James Blumstein for this insight.

183. Cf. Reichman & Uhlir, supranote 24 (discussing the problem of follow-on applications of
collections of data under proposed database protection laws).
184. Experience with Harry Fox licenses for mechanical rights in musical works protected
under 17 U.S.C. § 115 also demonstrates a potential lottery effect. See Merges, supranote 26.
185. Anyone who has followed me this far should now see why Breeder A would not often get
the chance to license such uses under either a copyright-like or patent-like hybrid regime, see
supra text accompanying notes 80-81, as distinct from what happens under the patent and copyright systems. Even where my scenarios tell only part of the story, moreover, and there is a
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I do not mean to imply that Breeder A, as a single enterprise, is better off under a liability rule than he or she would have
been under an exclusive right. The point of the whole exercise is
rather that members of the relevant technical community (and society as a whole) are cumulatively better off under such a regime,
while Breeder A is not always or necessarily worse off. At the same
time, Breeder B, pushed by his own business instincts and pulled
by the compensatory liability regime that protects his own follow-on
innovation, retains sufficient incentives to play the game. In other
words, once Breeder B opts to make equitable contributions to
Breeder A's costs of R&D, he puts himself in a position to collect
similar contributions not only from Breeders C, but even from
Breeder A, who will often want to exploit the second comer's followon innovation quickly in order to keep up with the state of the art
186
or move it forward.
The automatic license that characterizes the proposed compensatory liability regime thus eliminates the economically unjustifiable tendency of hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights to
allocate ownership of follow-on applications to either the first comer
(at the expense of others) or to second comers (at the expense of the
initial innovator). Instead, first comers will have to calculate their
business strategies knowing that second comers must pay compensation for follow-on applications of the small-scale innovation in
which they plan to invest (within a specified period of time) and
knowing also that they themselves are entitled to borrow back any
such follow-on applications in return for compensatory dues.
At the same time, the second comer's legal ability freely to
borrow the first comer's subpatentable innovation within specified
periods of time is limited in practice by the need to calculate the
impact on profitability of his contributions to the first comer's costs
of R&D. Within the specified time limits of the applicable regime,
this automatic license should empower all the relevant players at

stampede to license a small-scale innovation held under a sui generis right, there are obstacles.
Cf Eisenberg, supra note 12 (discussing why transactions in the biotech field may not go forward
even when they are in the licensor's interest). On balance, the green tulip exercise as a whole
shows why, in the case of small-scale innovations, a lottery effect at acceptable social costs is
possible only under a liability rule.
186. In that event, of course, Breeder A must himself contribute to the R&D costs of Breeders
B and C by paying compensatory royalties (in lieu of any negotiated royalty that should in fact
become a commonplace industry practice). See supra text accompanying notes 151-56. By borrowing back the features that Breeders B and C added to their own small-scale innovations,
indeed, Breeder A positions himself to compete with them on related or potential market segments without, however, either suffering or causing others to suffer the disadvantages of having
to compete against firms that free-ride on the costs of R&D.
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work on the shared technical trajectory to move back and forth between the status of lenders and that of borrowers as their business
instincts dictate, unimpeded by artificial legal barriers encumbering access to subpatentable innovation.
2. Other Applications
The proposed compensatory liability regime was articulated
with the historical problems of the developed industrial world in
mind, but it will prove beneficial in other contexts as well. For example, the development of the Internet, digitization, and electronic
commerce pose new challenges to small scale innovation. These advances reduce the cost of copying, shrink lead time, and increase
the risk that small-scale innovators will take matters into their own
hands and create totally unregulated states of artificial lead time
through encryption and adhesion contracts. If enforceable, these
electronically imposed standard form contracts could degenerate
into a basis for asserting private intellectual property rights that
override all the public-interest safeguards that had ensured access
187
to the public domain under traditional intellectual property laws.
There are serious risks that these standard-form adhesion contracts
could thus balkanize the information commons and reintroduce
conditions that impede the flow of information.
However, the enactment of a general purpose innovation law
on modified liability principles would lessen these risks because it
would offer those who innovate in this environment a way to alleviate market failure without impoverishing the public domain. Indeed, the convergence of telecommunications and digital technologies may itself contribute to the operation of the liability regime.
Online communication will expedite claim registration, help innovators find the know-how they need, facilitate negotiations, and
promote the use of standardized terms. Monitoring use and collecting royalties will likewise prove easier to organize and less
costly to implement online.
The compensatory liability regime proposed in this Article
would also help to cure some of the major problems afflicting the

187. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 121, at 914-51. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Propertyand ContractLaw for the InformationAge: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, Part I, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1999); Symposium, Intellectual Propertyand Contract Law for the InformationAge: The Impact
of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, Part
II, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 809 (1998).
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domestic patent laws in certain developed countries. In particular,
the mere existence of such a liability regime would alleviate pressures on the patent systems of countries where the level of nonobviousness has been pushed downwards in order to provide some refuge for commercially valuable, small-scale innovations of importance to local industries. A liability regime for small-scale applications of know-how to industry would allow the intellectual property
authorities and the courts to restrict the dominant patent-copyright
dichotomy to truly nonobvious inventions and original works of
authorship.
Furthermore, the proposed compensatory liability regime
would help to solve some pressing needs of the developing countries. In particular, such a regime would provide these countries
with new means of stimulating local innovation that would avoid
the pitfalls and contradictions of existing design protection laws
and utility model laws, and it could prove especially beneficial to
efforts to exploit their comparative advantages in certain cultural
industries. 188 It could also be modified to enable developing counties
suitably to protect the folklore and the traditional know-how of indigenous peoples. As with small-scale innovations, the goal is to
reward both first comers (in this case, the relevant indigenous
community) and second comers (those who build on the community's cultural heritage), without impeding access to the pubic domain or the flow of new products. With small amounts of tinkering,
a compensatory liability regime could be adapted to encourage use
of traditional knowledge without denying the relevant indigenous
communities the right to a fair share of the proceeds.
V. CONCLUSION
The objective of the green tulip exercise was to expose the
structural flaws underlying prior legal solutions to the problem of
small-scale innovation. The analysis showed that property-based
rules do not and cannot work in this environment. They return to
the first comer too little or too much, they impede follow-on developments, ignore the significant contributions of the public domain,
balkanize the knowledge base, and increase transaction costs.
A modified liability rule would resolve these difficulties.
Within a designated period of artificial lead time, firms are permitted to borrow one another's subpatentable innovations, but only

188. See Reichman, FreeRiders, supranote 47, at 58-74.

1798

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:6:1743

when they contribute to the costs of development. When this occurs,
the short-term commercial success of any player in the relevant
technical community should either have produced new investment
in new innovation or a flow of contributions back to other members
of the technical community in exchange for investment in follow-on
applications of their own subpatentable know-how during the very
recent past. The success of multiple players in the relevant technical universe should correspondingly augment the flow of investment
and technical information to that universe as a whole, as players
participate in the industry-wide virtual partnership that a liability
rule supports.
As a result, the relevant R&D decisions are properly rooted
in business judgements about the state of competition, the likelihood of commercial success, and the comparative economies that
would result from expenditure in de novo costs of reverse engineering as compared with the payment of equitable compensation to
other firms for the use of borrowed, small-scale innovation within
relatively short periods of time. Such decisions would not be skewed
by top-down legal monopolies that slowed the pace of competition
and made the public pay more for technical advances that would
have been achieved anyway in the absence of market-destructive
appropriations.

